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Summary 
The Arctic is one of the most severe and least developed international regions in the 
world. Despite arrangements such as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and its 
successor the Arctic Council, there is no existing viable multi-lateral Arctic body. Pari 
passu, earth’s climate change, primarily due to an increase of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere, is rapidly re-forming the Arctic. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment has 
concluded that the ice coverage in the region for 2010 is roughly equivalent of 50 percent 
of the coverage in the 1950’s. This decline of sea ice is progressively opening new 
opportunities for commercial activity in the region, such as Arctic marine transport 
traversing the “Arctic-shortcut” instead of the traditional sea-lanes through the Suez 
Canal. In addition, estimations by the United States Geological Survey states that the 
Arctic region could hold as much as 25 percent of the earth’s undiscovered oil and gas 
resources. Both the 2008 Illulissat Declaration and the 2010 Chelsea ministerial meeting 
reaffirmed the five Arctic coastal States’ firm commitments to the Law of the Sea. 
However, this thesis shows that the regulation of Arctic marine transport is comprised of 
an intricate multi-layered framework, which is not sufficiently tailored for the unique 
characteristics of the region. It is concluded that the Arctic sea routes are a highly 
complicated phenomena, since there are several complex legal disputes and 
controversies. 	  
 
The first conclusion is that the legal disputes and controversies in the Arctic sea routes, 
which materially constrain Arctic marine transport, are:  
• Internal waters in the NWP due to Canada’s straight baselines based under 
customary law; 
 
• “Creeping jurisdiction” in the NSR; 
 
• Increase of Arctic sovereignty through Article 234 and the provision’s ambiguity 
towards the transit passage regime; 
 
• Ambiguity regarding different interpretations of the transit passage regime and the 
international strait provision.  
Moreover, it is concluded that the legal disputes and controversies in the three examined 
Arctic sea routes bear several commonalities, differences and similarities. Overall it is 
concluded that the Arctic approach and legal development by Soviet, its successor 
Russia, and Canada are shaped mainly through foreign actions, such as the epic voyage of 
S/S Manhattan in 1969. Further, several legal scholars of respective Government or 
Duma have argued for expanding Arctic sovereignty, by, for example the sector theory, 
the “ice-is-land-theory” (mare liberum-res communis), historic title as a basis for internal 
waters, etc. However, contrariwise when analyzing State practice it becomes evident that 
both States have been reluctant to espouse such far-fetched legal arguments. In addition, 
it becomes evident that there is a lack of official statements and clarification from the 
Arctic coastal states. Unfortunately, this has given scholars free hand of interpretation - 
creating a diverse and ambiguous doctrinal view of the legal status of the Arctic. 
However, it is shown that both States has adopted a more functionalistic, step-by-step 
approach towards the Arctic. The reason seems to be, in general, that these legal disputes 
and controversies are largely irrelevant for the stakeholders of the Arctic, other than of 
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those who have an academic interest since the Arctic sea routes are not yet commercially 
viable. This lack of clarification and State practice could be intentional, since the thesis 
shows that both States has succeeded in increasing their respective Arctic sovereignty and 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the thesis also concludes that without icebreaker and ice-
forecasting support, both States effectively nationalized their respective sea routes many 
years ago. Furthermore, it is concluded that the Transpolar Sea Route in a legal 
perspective strongly differs from the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, 
since this sea route is out of reach for any Arctic state’s jurisdiction.   
 
The second purpose of the thesis analyzes the legal consequences of a possible 
internationalization of the sea routes. It is concluded that, given the commercial 
incentives and current downward trend in record lows of sea ice extent, it is not far-
fetched to anticipate a future with drastically increased commercial Arctic marine 
transport - leading to internationalization. Given this, different straits in the Northern Sea 
Route and the Northwest Passage will become international straits in accordance with the 
interpretation of the Corfu Channel case due to a lack of definition in the 1958 Territorial 
Sea Convention and the 1982 UNCLOS.  
 
Lastly, it is concluded that there is a general ambiguity on how to address the 
international strait provision and the transit passage regime. The spatial scope of Article 
234 and its relationship to the transit passage right is emphasized. In conjunction to this, 
several sub-questions are examined, such as the question of whether or not the transit 
passage regime “trumps” Article 234 or vice versa. In addition, it is also concluded that 
an internationalization of the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage would lead 
to the applicability of the transit passage regime. The pattern of several legal disputes and 
controversies would then shift radically.  
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1 General Introduction  
The introductionary pages aim to provide the reader with an overview of the subject 
matter and structure of this thesis. The purpose section presents the narrow core and 
focus of the thesis; legal disputes and controversies in the Arctic shipping routes and the 
legal impact of a future internationalization. It is worth noting that this thesis is written 
for academics and/or professionals with some basic Maritime Law knowledge and an 
understanding of the multidisciplinary complexity of the Arctic region.  
1.1 Background 
As of today the Arctic is one of the most severe and least developed international regions 
in the world. Prior to the Second World War only struggling northern indigenous 
populations could survive by the greatest of efforts. However, by the end of the Second 
World War technological advances allowed southerners to set foot and survive in the 
region. Unfortunately, the onset of the Cold War ended any opportunity for development 
of an international cooperative regime. By the ending of the Cold War there have been 
some development of international institutions and cooperation arrangements such as the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (hereinafter, “AEPS”) and its successor the 
Arctic Council (hereinafter, “AC”). Notwithstanding that organizations like these have 
had some success, there is today no existing viable multi-lateral Arctic body. Instead, the 
existing regime is described as “an immature, fragmented and stunted region-system.”1 In 
conjunction with earth’s climate change, which is due primarily to an increase of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (hereinafter, “ACIA”) 
has catalogued the range of impingements currently re-shaping the Arctic in a report.2 
The report states that the current decline of sea ice is moving “with a magnitude 
unprecedented over the past 1,450 years.“3 Further it concluded that 2010’s Arctic ice 
coverage is 1,4 million square kilometers less than in 2006 and roughly a 50 percent 
decrease in comparison to the 1950’s.4 
 
Despite the ecological challenges, the current decline of sea ice is progressively opening 
new opportunities for commercial vessels traversing the “Arctic-shortcut” from Europe to 
the Pacific with ensuing economic and environmental benefits. In addition, the feasibility 
of taking commercial advantage of the Arctic’s opulence in exploitable resources is 
becoming highly attractive. Estimations according to a study by the United States 
Geological Survey (hereinafter, “USGS”) suggests that the Arctic could contain as much 
as 25% of the earth’s undiscovered oil and gas resources.5  
 
In light of these potential drivers for increased commercial Arctic marine transport, it is 
remarkable that no effective legal instruments have been implemented to cope with the 
rapidly changing dynamics of the Arctic. Both the 2008 Illulissat Declaration and the 
                                                
1 Rob Huebert, ‘Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic’ in Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, and 
2 ACIA, Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge University Press, 
2004).  
3 Ibid, p. 12. 
4 Ibid, p. 13.  
5 USGS, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal; Estimations of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic 
Circle (U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 3049, 2008).  
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2010 Chelsea ministerial meeting reaffirmed the five Arctic coastal State’s firm 
commitment to the Law of the Sea.6 However, Arctic marine transport comprises an 
intricate multi-layered framework which is not sufficiently tailored for the unique 
characteristics of the region. It has become evident for the international community that 
developing profitable commercial waterways using the different Arctic sea routes are a 
highly complicated phenomena, since they are tinged by several complex legal disputes 
and controversies for Arctic marine transport.   
1.2 Purpose 
The primary purpose of this thesis is examining and analyzing legal disputes and 
controversies in light of an increase7 in commercial Arctic marine transport along the 
different sea routes. The sea routes relevant to this thesis are the Northern Sea Route 
(hereinafter, “NSR”), the Northwest Passage (hereinafter, “NWP”), and the Trans Polar 
Sea Route (hereinafter, “TSR”).  
  
The primary purpose can be divided into two elements: 
 
• First, the legal disputes and controversies associated to commercial Arctic marine 
transport will be examined and analyzed. The focus in this section (Chapter 4) is 
to examine the origin of each dispute or controversy, and examine how it affects 
Arctic marine transport. The overall question is: 
 
o Which are the legal disputes and controversies in the Arctic sea routes that 
materially constrain Arctic marine transport? What are their origins?  
 
• Secondly, the commonalities, differences and similarities of the legal disputes and 
controversies, as presented above, will be analyzed by a descriptive analysis 
through a comparative method. The overall question is:  
 
o What are the commonalities, differences and similarities of the legal 
disputes and controversies in the Arctic sea routes previously presented and 
what conclusions can be made of this in a wider scope?  
 
The secondary purpose, originating from the first, is to analyze the legal consequences of 
a future internationalization in the three Artic sea routes and how it will affect the 
previously presented disputes and controversies. The two questions are hereby:  
 
o What right of passage would apply after an internationalization in the NSR, 
the NWP, and the TSR?  
 
o What would the legal consequences be of the presented legal disputes and 
controversies if the transit passage regime would apply?  
                                                
6 The five coastal states bordering the Arctic Ocean are Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and 
the United States of America.  
7 See Chapter 2.  
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1.3 Method and Material  
This essay is a descriptive study of de lege lata in combination with an analytical 
comparative analysis of de lege ferenda.8 The method used is a combination of the legal 
dogmatic approach9 with emphasis on the jurisprudential method.10 By using a range of 
different sources such as legal instruments, international and national legislation and 
applying and analyzing different facts including inter alia state practice, geography and 
different scholars interpretation of customary law to such legislation the subject matter is 
examined. In addition, a comparative method is applied when analyzing commonalities, 
differences and similarities of the legal disputes and controversies.  
 
The comparative part in this thesis is based on the comparative method as relevant to 
international law, national legislation and historical legislation. In addition, other aspects 
such as economic incentives and historical traditions are, although not strictly of legal 
relevance, influential to some extent and must therefore be taken into account.11 The aim 
of the comparative analysis is to recognize similarities, differences and commonalities 
and use this data to draw conclusions in a wider scope, related to a future possible 
internationalization in the Arctic sea routes.  
 
Although legal doctrine dealing with legal disputes and controversies related to the Arctic 
sea routes is of a highly limited amount the author’s ambition has been to use a 
qualitative (contrary to quantitative) approach towards available legal doctrine. This 
approach has been used when utilizing other sources as well in order to retain a critical 
approach to the relevant sources of law.  
 
The development and approach to legal disputes and controversies in the Arctic dissent 
amongst the Arctic states, the non-Arctic states and international organizations such as 
the European Union (hereinafter, “EU”). Each entity upholds shoulder on differential 
approaches to science, economic interests and Arctic history, which is important to 
emphasize for the reader. The ambition has been to capture and analyze these differential 
approaches in order to present a (as much as possible) vivid analyze in the analytical and 
subjective parts of the thesis. 
1.4 Structure  
Following this general introduction for the thesis, Chapter 2 aims to provide the reader 
with a general overview of the driving forces behind the new commercial Arctic, with 
emphasis on the three Arctic sea routes (the NSR, the NWP, and the TSR). In addition, 
some unique aspects of the sea routes geography will be presented. The purpose of this 
chapter is to serve the reader with crucial non-legal background. This is necessary in 
order to understand the characteristics and complexity of the later on presented legal 
                                                
8 Michael Bogdan, Komparativ rättskunskap (1st edn, Nordstedts Juridik Stockholm, 2003) p. 23-24.  
9 The legal dogmatic approach is applied when discussing and describing the current legal position of 
different legal disputes and controversies, such as, inter alia existing legislation and outdated legislation in 
combination with state practice and customary law.  
10 Claes Sandgren, Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare (2nd edn, Nordstedts Juridik Stockholm, 2007) p. 
38. 
11 Ibid, p. 38 – 41.  
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disputes and controversies, as well as provide an understanding of the incitements for a 
possible internationalization of the sea routes.  
 
Chapter 3 serves the reader with the relevant legal governance and framework. Emphasis 
is on the law of the sea due to the Arctic geography and nature of marine Arctic transport. 
The subchapters in this Chapter are all formed to correlate with the later on presented 
legal disputes and controversies in Chapter 4, and will work as tools to understand the 
complex nature of the actual disputes and controversies presented in the following 
chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 is the core of this thesis and will solely focuses on the actual legal disputes and 
controversies in the Arctic sea routes. The chapter is structured by dividing the legal 
disputes and controversies into the three shipping sea routes – the NSR, the NWP, and the 
TSR. Due to the volume and range of the disputes and controversies, analyzing will be 
presented throughout the chapter to facilitate for the reader the outcome and conclusion 
of the disputes and controversies in the next coming chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 contains the comparative part of the essay, where the reader will be provided 
with a descriptive analyze through a comparative method by presenting similarities, 
differences and commonalities of the legal disputes and controversies presented in the 
previous chapter. In addition, this chapter will also serve as the end-conclusion for some 
disputes and controversies, which have proven to not constitute a major constraint for 
Arctic marine transport. Conclusions and findings drawn in Chapter 5 will serve as the 
basis when analyzing the secondarily purpose in the next coming chapter.  
 
Chapter 6 constitutes the secondarily purpose of the thesis as well as the general 
conclusion correlating to the purpose. In this chapter the question regarding legal 
consequences of a future internationalization in the NSR, the NWP, and the TSR will be 
presented. Based on what has been concluded and stated in the previous chapters, this 
data will be used to form the general conclusion, ending the thesis.    
1.5 Delimitation 
1.5.1 Subjects for Discussion  
The Arctic mainly consists of the Arctic Ocean encircled by Canada, Russia, the United 
States, Denmark (Greenland) and Norway. Trying to cover all legal disputes and 
controversies associated to marine Arctic transport within such an extensive area would 
break the boundaries of any graduate thesis. Therefore, several legal disputes and 
controversies have been excluded in order to make room for a more ample and in depth 
analysis. 
 
It is worth noting that this is not a multi-faced interdisciplinary study to outline and 
elaborate on the whole range of key issues and factors related to legal disputes and 
controversies in the Arctic sea routes. However, it should be emphasized that in this 
particular subject geostrategic considerations, economic and political power have a major 
impact and will most likely be a determining factor for future commercial Arctic marine 
transportation. Hence, the following areas below are not dealt with irrespective of their 
importance.  
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• Legal disputes and controversies associated to the Arctic continental shelf, such as the question if 
the entire Arctic Ocean could be subject to domestic legislation on the account of the common 
heritage principle (res communis).12 Further, jurisdictional authority over the continental shelf and 
hydrocarbon exploitation as primarily regulated through the 1982 UNCLOS, Article 76 will not 
further be commented, despite its importance and affect on Arctic marine transport. 
 
• There are at present several unsolved delimitation lines in the NSR and the NWP. For an example, 
the on-going discussion between Canada and the U.S. regarding the maritime boundary of the 
Beaufort Sea can be mentioned. Despite its importance and influence on Arctic marine transport, 
these disputes will no be further commented. Mainly due to its political character. 
 
• Legal disputes and controversies related to the Arctic fishing industry will not be examined even 
though, as later stated in the thesis, this is an important resource and constitutes a driving factor 
behind the new accessible commercial Arctic. 
 
• Legal disputes and controversies associated to territorial land claims will not be further 
commented, such as the dispute over the small uninhabitable rock known as Hans Island, even 
though the settlement will have a widespread affect on the borders in this important area for Arctic 
marine transport.   
 
• Of great importance are the commercial conditions of the Arctic sea routes, such as icebreaker 
fees, infrastructure etc. Irrespective of these crucial factors for Arctic marine transportation, no 
attention will be given to these conditions. In addition, no commercial outlook will be provided.  
1.5.2 Defining the Arctic  
As of today there is no generally acknowledged geographic or legal definition or 
delineation of the Arctic region.13 The subject cannot be addressed here in detail, 
although it is sufficient to state that none of the following definitions have achieved 
common approval or acceptance.14 However, they are all used extensively depending on 
interest or purpose.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Figure 1 
Definitions of the Arctic Region 
                                                
12 This question is thoroughly discussed by several scholars, for an example, see Ron Macnab, 
‘Complications in Delimiting the Outer Continental Shelf’ in Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, and 
Tomas H. Heidar, Changes In the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010) p. 493.  
13 Willy Østreng, Shipping in Arctic Waters: A Comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and Transpolar 
Passages (Springer & Praxis Publishing, 2013) p. 3.  
14 Eva Carina Helena Keskitalo, Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region 
(Taylor & Francis Books, 2004) p. 11.  
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Source: ACIA, supra note 2.  
 
The oldest and most common definition is the Arctic Circle, drawn by an imaginary line 
on the parallel of latitude located at 66° 33’ 44’’ (or 66.5622°) encircling an area north of 
the equator of roughly 8 percent of the world’s surface.15 This definition is based on solar 
radiation. However, as seen in Figure 1 the Arctic Circle-definition does not include 
Arctic sub-regions such as the Bering Strait, the White Sea, or the southern part of 
Greenland and the Hudson Bay. Therefore this definition has been subject to criticism.16 
As stated by one scholar: “these areas are as Arctic in natural conditions as most of the 
areas situated north of the Circle.“17 As a reaction of this criticism the noted Canadian 
researcher M. Dunbar launched a more modern subjective approach, elaborating with 
definitions based on their physical presence of the Arctic region.18 Several definitions in 
line with M. Dunbar’s subjective approach have been suggested, such as the 10 degree C 
July Isotherm, the marine boundary between cool and warm waters, the tree line, the 
continuous permafrost, etc., see Figure 1.  
 
However, despite applications of alternative criteria it is not sufficient to include all polar 
characteristic areas to a single concept, or definition, defined as the Arctic. As one 
scholar put it: “the differences in aerial extension between the various definitions 
amounts to thousands of square kilometers“.19 
 
A new approach was taken by the Arctic Monitoring Assessment Program (hereinafter, 
“AMAP”) of the Arctic Council (hereinafter, “AC”). The approach was multilateral and 
took into account all areas of science. The definition was later provided as guidelines 
where the Arctic according to the AMAP definition covered roughly around 33,4 million 
square kilometers of which 60 percent is Arctic waters with a latitudinal area between 
60°N and the Arctic Circle definition. Østreng states that: 
 
The AMAP applies multiple scientific political and pragmatic criteria that have 
been blended together to reach consensus across sectors and between the states. 
However, the ambiguity and flexibility of this definition causes overlaps with 
                                                
15 Østreng, supra note 13, p. 3. 
16 Ibid, p. 4.  
17 Ibid, pp. 4 – 5.  
18 Eva Carina Helena Keskitalo, supra note 14, p. 12.  
19 Ibid, p. 4. 
 11 
Sub-Arctic, which in principle should be the transition zone between the Arctic 
proper and temperature zone.20 
 
The AMAP definition has been adopted by the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
(hereinafter, “AMSA”) as well as the Canadian Arctic Shipping Assessment (hereinafter, 
“CASA”) although the two entities could not reach a degree of acceptance for the 
delineation of the Arctic. This is still an on-going debate tinged by uncertainty and 
ambiguity.  
 
Arctic waters 
In 2002 the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter, “IMO”) published 
Guidelines for Ships Operating in the Arctic Ice-covered waters (hereinafter, “IMO 
Guidelines”) in an attempt to define Arctic Waters.21 This definition differs from the 
previous definitions. The IMO Guidelines define Arctic waters solely on sea ice 
concentrations, i.e. just one polar characteristic. Section G-3.2 paragraph 2 states that 
 “sea ice concentrations of 1/10 coverage or greater … and which pose a structural risk to 
ships … are Arctic in character.”22 However, the IMO Guidelines provides no method to 
determine this concentration. Which is a weakness, bearing the geography of the area in 
mind. In addition, no time-criterion was presented. The geographical application for 
Arctic waters in the IMO Guidelines is defined in Section G-3.2, which reads:  
 
Arctic waters means those waters which are located north of  
a line extending from latitude 58°00’.0 N, longitude 042°00’.0 W to latitude 
64°37’.0 N, longitude 035°27’.0 W and thence by a rhumb line to 
latitude 67°03’.9 N, longitude 026°33’.4 W and thence by a rhumb line to 
Sørkapp, Jan Mayen and by the southern shore of Jan Mayen to the Island of 
Bjørnøya and thence by a great circle line from the Island of Bjørnøya to Cap 
Kanin Nos and thence by the northern shore of the Asian continent eastward to 
the Bering Strait and thence from the Bering Strait westward to latitude 60° N 
as far as Il’pyrskiy and following the 60th North parallel eastward as far as and 
including Etolin Strait and thence by the northern shore of the North American 
continent as far south as latitude 60° N and thence eastward along parallel of 
latitude 60° N, to longitude 56°37’.1 W and thence to the latitude 58°00’.0 N, 
longitude 042°00’.0 W 
 
However, the IMO definition may be re-defined. Such tendencies were evident during the 
54th meeting of the IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment23 in the on-going 
process of developing a mandatory International Code of Safety for Ships in Polar Waters24 
(hereinafter, “Polar Code”). It was stated that: “ while noting that such definitions might have 
to be revisited once the Code is further developed … proposes definitions of Arctic and 
Antarctic waters based on the physical and biological characteristics of these 
environments.”25 
 
                                                
20 Østreng, supra note 13, p. 5.  
21 IMO Guidelines, Guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters (IMO Doc. SC/Circ.1056 
MEPC/Circ.399, 23 December 2002)  
22 Ibid, G-3.2.2.  
23 IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Design & Equipment, Report to the Safety Committee (54th session, 
Agenda Item 23, DE 54/23 17 November 2010) 
24 See Chapter 3.1.1.2 regarding the on-going process of developing a mandatory Polar Code.  
25 IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Design & Equipment, supra note 48, p.22.  
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To summarize, each definition of the Arctic region are only partially satisfactory, depending 
on the governing interest or purpose. It must be emphasized, the importance of the chosen 
definition for the outcome of the legal dispute or controversy at hand. It is outside the scope 
of this thesis to analyze these different definitions. As for this thesis the Arctic will be 
defined according to the IMO definition. This is due to its pragmatic operational nature and 
its consideration of Arctic marine transport.  
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2 The New Accesible & Commercial 
Arctic 
This chapter focuses on the driving forces behind the new accessible and commercial 
Arctic. In addition, some basic information of the three Arctic sea routes’ unique 
geographic features and legal definitions is provided. In order to understand the 
characteristics and complexity of the legal disputes and controversies it is important to 
bear in mind the specific character and changing dynamics of the Arctic sea routes and 
their distant position on the world map. However, this is not fully addressed due to the 
boundaries of this thesis. Hence the reader is notified that this chapter is limited to only 
correlate with the legal disputes and controversies presented later on in the thesis.  
2.1 Climate Change  
The scientific causes and the process of climate change are not addressed here in detail. It 
is sufficient to state that reduced Arctic sea ice and other particular consequences in the 
Arctic is a palpable sign of climate change around the globe. Record lows of the Arctic 
sea ice extent in 2007 and 2012 “underscore robust downward trends in ice extent and 
thickness observed since 1979.“26 In a recent study with focus on the ice-covered Arctic 
Ocean the authors state that throughout human history natural climatic variability has 
caused interannual fluctuations in sea ice extent. Although, the authors state that the 
current decline of sea ice is moving “with a magnitude unprecedented over the past 1,450 
years.“27 Several other scholars’ climate model simulations reveals a universal academic 
concur28 of a proceeding sea ice decline in the Arctic passim the 21st century, with 
predictions of ice-free conditions under a short span of time during summer, starting as 
early as 2030 in some predictions.29 The ACIA’s research report ‘Impacts of Warming 
Arctic’, has stated that 2010’s Arctic ice covers 1,4 million square kilometers less than in 
2006. Going back even further, 2010’s Arctic ice cover is roughly equivalent to 50 per 
cent of the coverage in the 1950’s.30  
                                                
26 Scott R. Stephenson, ‘Projected 21st-Century Changes to Arctic Marine Access’ (2013) 1(1) Springer 
<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/297/556.pdf> accessed 22 July 2013, p. 1.  
27 Ibid, p. 2.  
28 See for an example Zhang X. and J. E. Walsh, ‘Towards a seasonally ice-covered Arctic Ocean: 
Scenarios from the IPCC AR4 model simulations’ (2006) 19(9) J. Climate 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/JCLI3767.1> accessed 22 July 2013, pp. 2 – 3., and Stephen J. Vavrus, 
‘Twenty-First-Century Arctic Climate Change in CCSM4’ (2012) 25(8) J. Climate 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-11-00220.1> accessed 22 July 2013, p. 1.  
29 Stephenson, supra note 26, p. 3.  
30 ACIA, supra note 2, p. 13. 
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2.2 Major Commercial Interests 
2.2.1 Commercial Marine Transportation 
As stated above, during the ending decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 
21st century, the Arctic has experienced a rapid temperature increase.31 Consequently, in a 
research study by the Arctic Institute the authors state that: “the effects of global warming 
may transform the Polar region from an inaccessible frozen dessert into a seasonally 
navigable ocean.”32  
 
Figure 2.1 
Summer and winter development of sea ice extent in the Arctic between 1979-2010 
 
Source: DNV Research and Innovation, supra note 31.  
 
The decrease of the Arctic sea ice is clearly shown in a commercial perspective. In the 
summer of 2011, 33 ships carrying 850,000 tons of cargo navigated the NSR, a record in 
total cargo freighted for the time.33 The advantages of traversing the three Arctic sea 
routes are overwhelming, both with respect to distance and time advantages compared to 
the Suez and Panama Canals. According to a recent study of future Arctic marine 
transport, the distance savings when navigating the Arctic transportation passages “can be 
as high as 40 percent compared to the traditional shipping lanes via the Suez Canal.”34 
For example, the distance between Yokohama in Japan and Hamburg in Germany is 6 
600 Nautical Miles (hereinafter, “NM”) when traversing the NSR in compared to the 
traditional 11 400 NM through the Suez Canal.35 The difference amounts to an 
approximated 42 percent reduction in freight distance.36  
 
Figure 2.2 
Transportation Routes between the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean 
                                                
31 See Chapter 2.1, and Lars Ingolf Eide, ‘Shipping Across the Arctic Ocean: A Feasible Option in 2030-
2050 as a Result of Global Warming?’ (2010) 0(4) DNV Research and Innovation 
<http://www.dnv.com/binaries/shipping%20across%20the%20arctic%20ocean%20position%20paper_tcm4
-434419.pdf> accessed 27 July 2013, p. 4.  
32 Malte Humpert & Andreas Raspotnik, ‘The Future of Arctic Shipping’ (The Arctic Institute: Center for 
Circumpolar Security Studies 11 October 2012) <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/10/the-future-of-
arctic-shipping.html> accessed 13 August 2013. The Arctic Institute is an interdisciplinary, independent 
think tank focused on Arctic policy issues with staff including specialists in Arctic climate science, 
geopolitics, law, oil and gas, and media. The Arctic Institute is not directly affiliated with any government 
entity, corporation or civil-society organization, see more at http://www.thearcticinstitute.org. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Willy Østreng, Shipping in Arctic Waters (Ocean Futures & Centre for High North Logistics 2010) p. 42.  
36 Ibid.  
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Source: The Arctic Institute, supra note 32. 
 
However, even if there are several advantages of traversing the three Arctic sea routes, 
Arctic marine transport will always be associated with higher hazard levels compared to 
the traditional routes. The challenging conditions of the Arctic include extreme cold, 
prolonged periods of darkness in the winter, extreme remoteness, severely low 
temperatures, difficulty of predicting weather forecasts and the environmental 
consequences due to the Arctic’s fragile ecosystem. Combined, these factors will need 
comprehensive and rigorous risk management for commercial shipping. Det Norske 
Veritas (hereinafter, “DNV”) has carefully analyzed these challenges for increased 
shipping and states “part-year Arctic transit may be economically attractive for container 
traffic … between 2030 and 2050.”37  
2.2.2 Undiscovered Conventional Oil and Gas 
Resources 
In May 2008 the US Geological Survey (hereinafter, “USGS”) completed an estimation 
of possible future additions to the world oil and gas reserves in all areas north of the 
Arctic Circle.38 The study, the Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (hereinafter, “CARA”), 
is geological and includes all volumes of sedimentary rock in the Arctic. The area north 
of the Arctic Circle (66.56° north latitude) is roughly six percent of the Earth’s surface.39 
CARA’s quantitative assessments were completed only in geological areas that “have at 
least a 10-percent chance of one or more significant oil or gas accumulations.” Further, it 
was stated that: “The study included only those resources believed to be recoverable 
using existing technology, but with the important assumptions for offshore areas that the 
resources would be recoverable even in the presence of permanent sea ice and oceanic 
water depth.”40  
The study concluded that the area north of the Arctic Circle has an estimated 90 billion 
barrels of undiscovered, technically recoverable oil; 1,670 trillion cubic feet of 
technically recoverable natural gas; and 44 billion barrels of technically recoverable 
natural gas liquids in 25 geologically defined areas thought to have potential for 
                                                
37 Lars Ingolf Eide, supra note 31, p. 19.   
38 USGS, supra note 5.   
39 Brenda S. Pierce, ‘US Geological Survey Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered 
Oil and Gas in the Highest Northern Latitudes’ in Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, and Tomas H. 
Heidar (eds), Changes In the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010) p. 535.  
40 USGS, supra note 5.  
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petroleum. In summary, these resources account for about 22 percent of the undiscovered, 
technically recoverable gas and oil resources in the world.41 The study further stated that 
the Arctic continental shelves “may constitute the geographically largest unexplored 
prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth.”42 
However, the study emphasized that no economic consideration were included in the 
estimations. It is important to note that without reference to costs of exploration and 
development the Energy return on investment43 (hereinafter, “EROI”) is impossible to 
calculate. It should also be noted that nonconventional resources, such as coal bed 
methane, gas hydrate, oil shale, and tar sand, were explicitly excluded from the CARA 
study.44   
2.2.3 Other Resources 
Fisheries 
Until recent years, fishing was the dominant part of the Arctic economy. Whilst the 
European countries mostly practice large-scale deep-sea fishing in the Barents Sea and 
outside the coast of Norway and Greenland, indigenous Arctic populations practice 
small-scale coastal fishing. The total fisheries’ catches in the Arctic Ocean is estimated to 
950,000 tonnes from 1950 to 2006, where 770,000 tonnes being Russia solely. 45 As 
different models suggests that ocean temperature increase, fish species are very likely to 
migrate north - leading to an estimated increase of catch potential in higher latitudes by 
20 percent.46 
 
Mining 
As the Arctic evolves due to climate change, mineral deposits like nickel, copper, 
wolfram, gold, silver, manganese, chromium and titanium are becoming more accessible 
than before. The estimated value of the Arctic’s minerals totals roughly around US $1.5-2 
trillion.47  
 
Tourism 
Tourism in the Arctic began in the 1970s and has developed rapidly in recent years. In 
2007 around 2.5 million tourists visited the Arctic region.48  
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Energy return on investment (EROI) is a physical measure of scarcity where the ratio of the energy 
delivered by process of the energy used directly and indirectly in the process, see more at: http://energy-
reality.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/09_Energy-Return-on-Investment_R1_012913.pdf.  
44 USGS, supra note 5. 
45 Alex Williams, ‘The Future of Arctic Enterprise: Long-term Outlook and Implications’ (2010) 1(1) 
Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment University of Oxford, p. 12. 
<https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/ssee_arctic_forecasting_study_november_2011.pdf> accessed 13 
August 2013. 
46 Ibid, p. 13. 
47 Irina Burakova, ‘Development of Arctic Areas to Bring Trillions of Dollars of Profit to Russia’ 
PRAVDA.Ru (Moscow, 21 April 2005) <http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/21-04-2005/8102-arctic-
0/#> accessed 23 November 2013.  
48 Alex Williams, supra note 45, p. 14.  
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2.3 The Arctic Sea Routes  
The NSR and the NWP are often in doctrine anticipated to be coastal sea-lanes while the 
TSR is expected to include a mid-ocean route, in some cases crossing the North Pole. 
This perception is misleading. Arctic marine transport navigating the three Arctic sea 
routes is far more complex due to the massive presence of sea ice. According to Østreng, 
large amounts of sea ice in the sea routes forces vessels to follow different unchartered 
channels depending on the vessel’s characteristics.49  
Figure 2.3 
Arctic Shipping Routes in the Arctic 
 
Source: The Arctic Institute, supra note 32. 
 
Østreng states that: “each of them is more like a broad transportation corridor stretching 
out in the north-south direction, containing several alternative navigational channels and 
fairly huge expanses of ice-infested waters.“50 
2.3.1 The Northern Sea Route  
The Russian scholar Timtchenko has translated the Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary’s 
definition of the NSR. According to this translation the NSR is “a major navigation route 
along the northern coast of the USSR. The chief Soviet artery in the Arctic, it passes 
through the seas of the Arctic Ocean … linking the ports of the European part of the 
USSR and Soviet Far East and the mouths of navigable Siberian rivers and forming a 
unified nationwide transportation system.”51 The geographic nature of the interpretation 
of the definition needs to be emphasized, since this sea route is often referred to as the 
Northeast Passage (hereinafter, “NEP”) in western literature although they are not 
identical.52 
 
 
                                                
49 Willy Østreng, supra note 35, p. 13. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Leonid Timtchenko, ‘The Northern Sea Route: Russian Management and Jurisdiction Over Navigation in 
Arctic Seas’ in Alex G. Oude Elferink & Donald R. Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar 
Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers & Kluwer Law International, 2001) p. 
270.  
52 Ibid, pp. 271 – 273.  
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Figure 2.4 
The Northern Sea Route 
 
Source: http://www.iho.int/mtg_docs/rhc/ArHC/ArHC2/ARHC2-04C_Marine_Traffic_in_the_Arctic_2011.pdf 
 
The Northeast Passage or the Northern Sea Route?  
There are several definitions of the NSR in the legal doctrine. Western literature often 
mentions the NEP when in fact referring to the NSR. It is important to note that the NSR 
and the NEP is not the same route in a legal perspective. According to Østreng, the NSR 
is a part of the NEP.53 Timtchenko endorses Østreng’s view, noting that: “the NSR which 
connects the northwest areas of Russia with the Bering Strait, is actually a part of the 
much longer Northeast Passage.”54 Russian scholars Kolodkin and Volosov go even 
further, stating that: “The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a rather complicated 
communication organism … the NSR is the major national sea route … accordingly, the 
Northeast Passage means an aggregate of seaways which … pass outside Russian waters 
and are not the Northern Sea Route seaways.”55 However, several scholars, including 
Timtchenko, have dismissed this interpretation as to wide, stating that: “it is hardly 
possible to agree with the Russian authors.“56 Clearly though, the NEP and the NSR are 
not the same passages, although some conformity amongst scholars suggests that the 
latter is only a part of the NEP - composing approximately 90 percent of the sea route.57 
Depending on the different definitions of the Arctic as discussed in Chapter 1.5.2, these 
interpretations may be the subject for change. 
 
Definitions of the Northern Sea Route 
There are several definitions of the NSR besides the official one. Østreng claims that 
there are two approaches that should be applied when determining the coordinates of the 
NSR. He notes that: “An official definition as found in Russian laws and regulations, and 
an unofficial Russian functional definition based on a mixture of organizational, 
operational and geopolitical criteria.”58 In addition, several other scholars have presented 
various definitions of the NSR although the response seems to have been made in a low-
                                                
53 Willy Østreng, ‘The Northern Sea Route: A New Era in Soviet Policy?’ (1991) 22(3) Ocean 
Development & International Law, p. 260.  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908329109545958#preview> accessed 28 February 2014. 
54 Leonid Timtchenko, supra note 51, p. 271.   
55 A.L. Kolodkin, V. Y. Markov and A.P. Ushakov, ‘Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic’ 
(1997) (3)1 Insrop Working Paper, pp. 34 – 35.   
56 Leonid Timtchenko, supra note 51, pp. 270 – 273.  
57 Willy Østreng, supra note 13, p. 18.  
58 Willy Østreng, supra note 35, p. 12. 
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key fashion within the international maritime law community.59  
 
Kolodkin’s and Volosov’s perspective has gained recognition among several scholars and 
will mark the basis for the unofficial functional definition in this thesis.60  
 
Unlike the majority of other transport routes, both land and sea, the Northern 
Sea Route has no single fixed route. … the route may vary by great distances in 
latitude from year to year … it may skirt the north of the Novaia Zemlia and 
Severnaia Zemlia archipelagos, bypassing the straits separating those and other 
land formations from the continental territory of the USSR. But under any 
circumstances a significant part of the Northern Sea Route lies within the 
Soviet economic zone, or the territorial and even internal waters of the USSR.61 
 
The latest official definition of the NSR was adopted through the 1990 Decree “On 
Measures for Securing the Implementation of the Edict of the Presidium of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet of 26 November 1984 ‘On Strengthening of the Protection of Nature in 
the Extreme North and Marine Areas Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the USSR’ “, in 
the ‘Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route’62 which 
through Article 1(2) reads as follows:  
 
The Northern Sea Route – national transportation route of the USSR, which is 
situated within the inland waters, territorial sea (territorial waters), or exclusive 
economic zone adjoining the USSR northern coast, and includes seaways 
suitable for guiding ships in ice. The extreme points of which in the west are 
the western entrances to the Novaya Zemlya straits and the meridian running 
from Mys Zhelaniya northward. And in the east, in the Bering Strait, by the 
parallel 66°N and the meridian 168°58’37”W.”63 
2.3.2 The Northwest Passage  
The Archipelago of the NWP is the largest in the world and consists of a myriad of 
labyrinth-shaped vegetation, mainly constituted by islands and headlands separated from 
the mainland. Starting in the west from the Beaufort Sea, the archipelago stretches to the 
Baffin Bay in the east, covering a distance of roughly 2,400 km. The northern point, 
Ellesmere Island, is around 900 km from the geographic North Pole, while the southern 
border is 60 degrees north latitude. According to a report by the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment (hereinafter, “AMSA”), this triangular area is around 2.1 million km2; 
roughly the size of Greenland.64  
 
                                                
59 See especially Leonid Tymchenko, supra note 51, pp. 269 – 274 for a thoroughly review of different 
interpretations/definitions of the NSR.   
60 See for an example Leonid Tymchenko, supra note 51, p. 272 and Willy Østreng, supra note 13, p. 18.  
61 A. L. Kolodkin and M. E. Volosov, ‘The Legal Regime of the Soviet Arctic: Major Issues’ (1990) 14 
Marine Policy, pp. 159 – 160.  
62 Cited through Leonid Tymchenko, supra note 51, p. 271 due to Russian legislation without translation, 
see also Willy Østreng, supra note 13, pp. 18 – 20.   
63 Ibid, see also the unofficial translation of the ‘Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern 
Sea Route’ at: <http://www.arctic-
lio.com/docs/nsr/legislation/Rules_of_navigation_on_the_seaways_of_the_Northern_Sea_Route.pdf>  
64 Arctic Council, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment 2009 Report (2nd pr. 2009) p. 19. <http://library.arcticportal.org/id/eprint/1400> accessed 12 
October 2013. 
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The Archipelago consists of 73 major settled islands and 18,114 smaller ones.65 Including 
small islets and rocks in the area, the Archipelago consist of roughly 36,000 smaller bits 
or islands above sea level, making the area one of the most complex geographies on earth 
for arctic marine transport.66 The NWP is in a similar way structured like the NSR - a 
transport corridor where there is no single, permanent channel for vessels to strictly 
follow due to massive presence of sea ice.  
 
The Archipelago consists of five different routes or passages of which three are 
considered to be suitable for regular navigation due to the highly variation of sea ice 
conditions.67 As seen in the Figure 2.5, these three routes are the: (i) The M’Clure strait, 
(ii) the Prince of Wales strait and (iii) the Peel Sound.  
 
Figure 2.5 
The Northwest Passage 
 
Source: http://www.enr.gov.nt.ca/_live/pages/wpPages/soe_human_activities.aspx 
 
Sea ice conditions in the NWP are complex for commercial shipping since the minimum 
sea-ice extent in the eastern regions and western regions are highly volatile as a result of 
its unique geography.68 The shortest and deepest route through the NWP is the M’Clure 
strait, with an average depth of 400m.69 However, the strait is also the most difficult and 
dangerous passage due to exceptional ice conditions, such as old and solid multi-year ice, 
resulting in possible delays or damages to regular and ice-strengthened ships. This risk is 
always present, even during the 10-15 days known as the favorable shipping season.70 As 
an alternative route, the Prince of Wales strait is a more accessible route, avoiding the 
exceptional harsh ice-conditions in the M’Clure Strait. However, this strait is bordered by 
fluctuations in depth variety with less than 20 meters in some parts, making it non-
accessible for some vessels.71 The third route that is seen as navigable by mariners in the 
NWP is the Peel Sound. However, the Peel Sound is restricted to vessels with a 
maximum of 10 m draughts.72 
                                                
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid, p. 20.   
67 Ibid, p. 21.  
68 Willy Østreng, supra note 35, p. 22. 
69 Ibid, p. 23.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid, pp. 23 – 24.   
72 Ibid.  
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2.3.3 The Transpolar Sea Route  
The TSR is the central part of the Arctic Ocean and represents a “direct route” for trans-
Arctic marine transport. The sea route is positioned outside the geographical reach of any 
national jurisdiction in international waters where the freedom of navigation applies.73  
 
Figure 2.6 
The Transpolar Sea Route 
 
Source: http://neven1.typepad.com/blog/2011/06/across-the-north-pole.html 
 
The TSR has no draft limitations, narrow straits or complex archipelago – instead the 
main obstacle is the multi-year ice present for most of the Arctic-shipping season.74 
Given the harsh environment for Arctic marine transport in the TSR no commercial 
vessel has yet crossed the central Artic Ocean (the TSR).75 The TSR implies both intra-
Arctic, destination-Arctic and transiting purposes, where marine transport can use the sea 
route to also enter waters of the NSR or the NWP. Therefore it can be subject to domestic 
legislation, or by accessing and entering the Bering and Fram Straits, only be subject to 
the high seas regime. Some scholars suggests that it is not unreasonable that it may take 
another 20 – 40 years before any type of commercial shipping conditions through the 
TSR will prove attractive enough for shipping companies.76  
 
The definition of the TSR in this thesis will include the Central Arctic Basin, roughly 
covering 4.7 million km2 in area, and all water expanses beyond the 12 NM territorial 
seas. Given this definition, jurisdictional rights and obligations from 188 NM measured 
from the Arctic coastal State’s territorial sea is, as later discussed, mixed (see Chapter 
3.1.1.1).   
                                                
73 See 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter, “UNCLOS”), Part VII. See also 
Chapter 3.1.1.1 for a thoroughly discussion of the high seas regime.  
74 Malte Humpert & Andreas Raspotnik, ‘The future of Arctic Shipping Along the Transarctic Sea Route’ 
in Lassi Heininen (eds), Arctic Yearbook 2012 (Northern Research Forum 2012) p. 283. 
<http://www.arcticyearbook.com> accessed 12 February 2014.   
75 Willy Østreng, supra note 35, p. 32.  
76 Lars Ingolf Eide, supra note 31, pp. 14 – 15.  
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3 Legal Framework in the Arctic  
This chapter will focus on the relevant legal governance and framework for the next 
chapter’s legal disputes and controversies. The aim is to provide the reader with the 
necessary basic tools to understand the more complex nature of what will be discussed in 
the forthcoming chapters. Emphasis is on the law of the sea due to the Arctic’s geography 
and the nature of commercial Arctic marine transport. In order to allocate space for a 
more thoroughly and narrow analyze on the later on presented matters, the reader is 
noted that extensive reference is conducted throughout the thesis to the sub-chapters in 
this part.  
3.1 International Law of Interest  
3.1.1 The Law of the Sea 
The law of the sea is a body of customs, treaties and international agreements. It relates to 
matters of state sovereignty, jurisdiction and rights over waters, the seabed, its subsoil, 
and the airspace above the sea.  
 
Sources of Law  
International law is seen as the “product of the voluntary subscription of States to rules of 
law.”77 The statement is reflected in Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of 
Justice (hereinafter, “ICJ”), which legislates the ICJ to decide to such disputes as are 
submitted to it. The ICJ’s decision shall apply: 
 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law. 
 
When determining the sources of the law of the sea the 1982 United Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (hereinafter, “UNCLOS”) importance needs to be recognized.78 It came 
into force on November 16, 1994; more than ten years after it was concluded. The 
international treaty was the result of more than nine years of negotiations.79 The entry 
into force represents an outstanding achievement of international law being hailed as “the 
modern constitution of the oceans“80 with its 320 Articles and 9 annexes. In addition to 
this multilateral treaty, the law of the sea is fundamentally a part of the general discipline 
                                                
77 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 1988) p. 4.  
78 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec. 10, 1982, United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 
1833, No. 31363, p. 397. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf> accessed 21 July 2013.  
79 Richards Barnes, ‘The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects’ in David Freestone, Richard Barnes and 
David M Ong (eds) The Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 1.  
80 Ibid.  
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of international law, consisting mostly of relevant customary law, bilateral as well as 
multilateral.81 
 
For issues not codified in the UNCLOS or for states not parties to the UNCLOS, the 
second source of law is comprised of the four multilateral Geneva Conventions from 
1958.82 In addition, several other treaties and conventions deals with various aspects of 
the law of the sea, such as the 1973 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
and Protocol 1978 (hereinafter, “MARPOL”)83 and the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (hereinafter, “SOLAS”)84. It needs to be noted that rules concerning 
interpretation, conclusion, termination and suspension of treaties are set out in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.85  
 
In case a state is not a party to the Geneva Conventions, international customary law 
(such as expressed in Article 38 of the Statue of the ICJ) is governing.86 The concept of 
the Exclusive Economic Zone (hereinafter, “EEZ”) is an expression of customary law 
now codified in UNCLOS. According to Churchill and Lowe, Orthodox legal theory 
requires proof of two elements when establishing existence of a rule of customary law: 
 
First, a general and consistent practice adopted by States. This practice need 
not be universally adopted, and in assessing its generality special weight will 
be given to the practice of States most directly concerned – for example, the 
practice of coastal States in the case of claims to maritime zones, or of the 
major shipping States in claims to jurisdiction over merchant ships. The second 
element is the so-called opinion juris – the conviction that the practice is one 
which is either required or allowed by international customary law.87 
 
Further, the authors state that customary law is in principle binding for all States.88 
However, this general rule has two major exemptions. First, States who persistently 
objects to an emerging rule of customary law “will not be bound by that rule.“89 This was 
confirmed by the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case.90 The second exemption is:  
                                                
81 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2013) p. 217.  
82 Ibid, p. 218. See also the 1928 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, on the 
Continental Shelf, on the High Seas, and on the Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High 
Seas, available at < http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html> accessed 23 July 2013.   
83 United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 1340, No. 22484, p. 61 Available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201340/volume-1340-I-22484-English.pdf> 
accessed 23 July 2013.  
84 United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 1148, No. 18961, p. 2. Available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201522/volume-1522-A-18961-English.pdf> 
accessed 23 July 2013.  
85 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codified and added customary law on the subject of 
rules concerning conclusion, interpretation etc. of treaties. See United Nations, Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 23 May, 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331. For further reading of the 
Convention, see Richards Barnes, supra note 79, p. 5.  
86 Martin Dixon, supra note 81, p. 219. 
87 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, supra note 77, pp. 5- 6.  
88 Churchill and Lowe state: ”Customary international law is, in principle, binding upon all States. 
However, the essential role of consent in the formation of customary law has two important consequences 
as this general principle is concerned”, see R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, supra note 77, pp. 6 – 7.   
89 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, supra note 77, p. 7.  
90 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe state: “the United Kingdom failed to prove sufficient generality in the 
practice of adopting a ten-mile limit to establish it as a rule of customary law“, see R. R. Churchill and A. 
V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 1988) p. 7., see also Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR.  
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The determinative role of the consent as the basis of obligation in customary 
law is that it is unnecessary to have recourse to the general practice of States in 
order to create a presumption that a particular State is bound by a rule if it can 
be proved that that State has in fact consented to that rule.91 
3.1.1.1 Maritime Zones  
Territorial Sea (& the Right of Innocent Passage) 
Article 1 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention defines the territorial sea as “the 
sovereignty of a state extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of 
sea adjacent to its coast, described as territorial sea.”92 In addition, Article 2 of UNCLOS 
provides archipelagic State’s: “Sovereignty … and, in the case of an archipelagic State, 
its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.”93 
Sovereignty over the territorial sea implies an exclusive maritime border not exceeding 
12 NM width of water exclusively controlled (and fully legislative) by the coastal state.94 
The sovereignty also extends to the air space, bed and subsoil. Nevertheless, a restriction 
of the sovereignty of the coastal state is the right for other nation’s vessels right for 
innocent passage through the territorial sea (compared to the coastal state’s internal 
waters which are fully within the unrestricted jurisdiction of the coastal state).95  The 
right of foreign marine transport (in comparison with warships) to pass unhindered 
through the territorial sea of a coast is an old accepted principle in customary maritime 
law, despite sovereignty of the coastal state.96 Article 17 of UNCLOS states the principle: 
“ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea.” Although it should be noted that the term “innocent” is 
somewhat blurred in the doctrine and open to contrary interpretation.97 In addition, the 
right of innocent passage in territorial waters is in certain situations restricted.98  
 
Straight Baselines  
The traditional principle in customary internal law when defining the width of the 
territorial sea is by measuring from the low-water mark around the coasts of the state. 
This principle was reiterated in Article 3 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and Article 5 of UNCLOS. However, special 
rules has evolved when geography of a state’s coast will be such as to cause problems 
when applying the traditional principle, such as when coastlines are deeply intended, 
numerous islands running parallel to coasts, or where existing bays are cutting into 
                                                
91 Ibid, p. 7.  
92 United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 516, No. 7477, p. 205.  
93 United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1833, No. 31363, p. 400.  
94 UNCLOS, Article 3, which state: “Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up 
to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the baselines determined in accordance with this 
Convention“. As of 2009, 137 states claimed a 12 nm territorial sea out of a total 150 states with 
proclaimed territorial sea limits. Compliance with Article 3 of the UNCLOS is 94 percent, indicating a very 
high level of acceptance and adherence to the current 12 nm limit of the territorial sea. See more at, 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/oceansday10_oxman.pdf> accessed 23 July 2013.  
95 Internal waters, such as harbours, lakes or rivers, are waters to be found on the landward side of the 
baselines from which the width of the territorial and other zones is measured, see Article 8, UNCLOS.  
Internal waters are classed as belonging to the land territory of the coastal state, they differ from the 
territorial sea since there exists no right of innocent passage.  
96 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (1st supp, 6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) p. 570.   
97 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, supra note 77, p. 82.  
98 Such as the right of exercising criminal jurisdiction over other state-flagged vessels, see UNCLOS, 
Article 27 – 28.  
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coastlines. These peculiar problems was raised in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case99 
where the ICJ noted that the normal method of drawing baselines that are parallel to the 
coast (the tracé parallèle) was not applicable. This was due to the fact that it would 
“necessitate complex geographical geometrical constructions in view of extreme 
indentations of the coastline and the existence of the series of islands fringing the 
coasts.”100 Instead the Court raised the concept of straight baselines as a valid principle of 
international law applicable to special geographic conditions with certain criteria for 
determining the applicability.101 These criteria was later codified and expanded in Article 
4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea from 1958 (hereinafter “Territorial Sea 
Convention”). The ICJ clarified in the Qatar v. Bahrain case that:  
 
The method of straight baselines, which is an exception to the normal rules for 
the determination of baselines, may only be applied if a number of conditions 
are met. Such conditions are primarily that either the coastline is deeply 
intended and cut into, or that there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its 
immediate vicinity.102 
 
The Court also emphasized that even though a state considers itself as a multiple-island 
state or is de facto an archipelago there is no incentives for deviating from the normal 
rules of determination of baselines, unless relevant conditions are met.103   
 
Historic Internal Waters & Bays  
Article 7 of the Territorial Sea Convention and Article 10 of UNCLOS does not apply to 
historic bays. Nevertheless, the status of historic bays has been directly referred to in 
early codifications of the law of the sea.104 Both the Territorial Sea Convention as well as 
UNCLOS specifically exclude historic bays from the regime of jurisdictional bays, 
resulting in that the legal status of historic bays are based on customary law.105  
Historic bays need to be distinguished from the concept of historic internal waters, which 
the ICJ noted in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case by stating: “waters that are treated 
as internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of 
an historic title”.106 In the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute the Court 
endorsed a new view by observing that the regime of an historic bay in the gulf of 
Fonseca was sui generis, declaring that each historic bay may have its own distinctive 
legal regime.107 
 
In 1962 a study of the juridical regime governing historic waters, including historic bays, 
was published by the United Nations (hereinafter, “UN”). In the study a general criterion 
for establishing a historic title was concluded. It identified that a State “may validly claim 
title to a bay on historic grounds if it can show that it has for a considerable period of 
                                                
99 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, ICJ Reports, supra note 90, see especially p. 186.   
100 Malcolm N. Shaw, supra note 96, p. 560. 
101 For further reading, Malcolm N. Shaw, supra note 96, pp. 560 – 561.  
102 Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, ICJ 
Reports, 2001, pp. 44 – 461 ILR.  
103 Malcolm N. Shaw, supra note 96, p. 562.  
104 Donald R. Rothwell & Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (1st supp, 2th edn, Hart 
Publishing 2010) pp. 48 – 49.   
105 Ibid.  
106 ICJ Reports, supra note 99, p. 91.  
107 Donald R. Rothwell & Tim Stephens, supra note 104, p. 48. See also Land, Island and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 151 - 384 ILR. 
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time claimed the bay as internal waters and effectively exercised its authority therein, and 
that during this time the claim has received the acquiescence of other States”.108 
However, the study has not lead to any international legislative action, and therefore (as 
previously noted) customary law governs the position regarding historic bays.  
 
Two principal issues are associated with the term historic bays. Firstly, the definition of 
the certain criteria is vague whether an area can be defined as an historic bay. The ICJ 
confirmed in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute that the gulf of Fonseca is a 
historic bay, due to the joint sovereignty exercised by El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua.109 The ICJ states that what has been defined as “pluri-State bay” is to be 
regarded as historic bays.110  
 
Further, the American Branch of International Law Association in 2003 proposed that the 
term historic bay:  
 
Means a bay over which a coastal State has publicly claimed and exercised 
jurisdiction, and this jurisdiction has been accepted by other States. Historic 
bays need not meet requirements prescribed in the definition of ‘bay’ in the 
Convention, Article 10 (2)111  
 
In addition, the authors stated that: “this definition appears to follow the United States 
position.”112 
 
The second issue regards the delimitation of historic bays. The ICJ considered this issue 
in the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute. It noted that a 
normal geographical closing line for the waters of the gulf of Fonesca between the two 
natural entrance points into the gulf had been something that the three coastal states “had 
recognized in their practice”.113 To conclude, the ruling from the ICJ means that a closing 
line for historic bays which reflects general principles of international law, as well as 
customary law, in its delimitation has legitimacy as long as other states has accepted the 
delimitation.114 The decision is some what confirmed by the controversial claim of Libya 
to the gulf of Sidra,115 where protests from several states, including the U.S., the United 
Kingdom and Soviet has according to Churchill and Lowe resulted in “that the Gulf of 
Sidra is not an historic bay.”116 
 
The Exclusive Economic Zone 
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The EEZ has developed out of earlier, more tentative claims, mainly relating to fishing 
zones.117 Established by UNCLOS Article 56, coastal state in their EEZ has inter alia:  
 
(a) Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and its subsoil and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy 
from the water, currents and winds;  
(b) jurisdiction with regard to (i) the architecture and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.118 
 
The rights span up to a distance of 200 nm.119 The EEZ combines characteristics of the 
territorial sea and the high seas, but cannot be assimilated into either. It is a sui generis 
zone with its own distinctive regime, in the legal doctrine being described as an 
“amalgam, or ‘multifunctional zone … which coastal states enjoy sovereign rights … to 
economic resources, and … environmental protection.”120 In comparison to the territorial 
sea, coastal State’s EEZ do not have a plenary and ipso jure entitlement to sovereignty.121 
In addition, other states are not entitled to unfettered freedoms like the high seas, even 
though they enjoy the freedom to navigate, over flight, lay submarine cables “and other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as associated with 
the operation of ships“.122 A wide variety of states have in the two last decades claimed 
an EEZ of 200 NM.123 This, a large number of states claiming a 200 NM EEZ, should 
indicate the existence of the EEZ-concept as customary law. Which has been emphasized 
by the ICJ in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case, asserting that: “the institution of the 
exclusive economic zone … is shown by the practice of states to have become a part of 
customary law.”124 
 
The High Seas 
The essence of the freedom of the high seas is that no state may acquire sovereignty over 
parts of them.125 However, the high seas is a subject to the operation of the doctrines of 
recognition, acquiescence and prescription, which may be subject for state’s sovereignty, 
as emphasized in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case.126 The origin of the high seas was 
defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 1, stating that all parts 
of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in internal waters of a State 
represents the high seas. This reflected the present customary international law.127 
                                                
117 Donald R. Rothwell & Tim Stephens, supra note 104, p. 82.   
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However, progressive development of State’s actions lead to re-defining the high seas in 
UNCLOS, now including “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive 
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the 
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.”128 Article 87 of UNCLOS provides that the 
high seas are open to all states, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas 
“is exercised under conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of 
international law.”129 It includes inter alia freedom of navigation, over flight, laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines, constructing artificial islands, fishing and scientific 
research.130 Such freedoms are to be exercised with due regard for the interests of other 
states, as stated in the Nuclear Tests case and Article 88 of UNCLOS.131 Article 89 
provides that: “no state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its 
sovereignty.” In general, the high seas should be regarded as res communis-area. 
Regarding jurisdiction on the high seas, it was concluded in the Lotus case132 that the 
basic principle relating to jurisdiction on the high seas is that the flag state alone may 
exercise such rights over the vessel.133 However, the exclusivity of flag-state jurisdiction 
is a subject to multiple exceptions.134 
 
International Straits & Transit Right135  
Article 37 of UNCLOS established a new right of transit passage to straits used for 
international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone 
and another part of the high seas or an exclusive zone. This transit right reaffirms that the 
legal status of the waters of the strait in question is unaffected by the provisions dealing 
with the passage.136 The right of transit passage involves the exercise of the freedom of 
navigation as well as over flight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious 
transit of the strait and does not preclude passage through the strait to enter or leave a 
state bordering that strait.137 However, there are three exceptions to the right of transit 
passage.138 In addition, it is unclear whether the right of transit passage has reached the 
status of customary law.139 
 
Regarding innocent passage in international straits, Article 16(4) of the Convention on 
the Territorial Sea declares that:  
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There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through 
straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high 
seas and another part of high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state.  
 
The provision needs to be read in conjunction with the ICJ judgment in the Corfu 
Channel case as well as Article 45 of UNCLOS stating that: “the regime of innocent 
passage … shall apply in straits used for international navigation … there shall be no 
suspension of innocent passage through such straits”. Clearly, Article 45 of UNCLOS 
states that the regime of innocent passage will apply with regard to straits used for 
international navigation excluded from the transit passage provisions by Article 38(1) and 
to international straits between a part of the high seas or EEZ and the territorial sea of a 
foreign state. 
 
It should also be noted that the Court in the case emphasized the situation regarding 
warships by stating that: “States in time of peace have a right to send their warships 
through straits used for international navigation … without the previous authorization of 
a coastal state … provided that the passage is innocent.”140 
3.1.1.2 ”The Arctic Clause”141  
Article 234 of UNCLOS is a somewhat controversial142 provision granting coastal states 
special regulatory powers and enforcement rights in ice-covered waters “for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels“ within a 200 NM 
limit.143 The article reads as follows:  
 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from 
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, 
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering 
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to 
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to 
or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations 
shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.  
 
In order to understand the underlying impulsion of the development of Article 234, it is 
crucial to understand the legal controversies and disputes in 1970’s between the U.S., 
Canada and the Soviet (as thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 4). The Canadian scholar 
Huebert has expressed that Article 234 provided Canada and Russia with a way of 
“which it could extend its jurisdiction over its Arctic waters in a manner that would avoid 
a diplomatic conflict.”144 Canada’s opinion145 is that Article 234 provides international 
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acceptance to the Artic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (hereinafter, “AWPPA”).146 
However, it needs to be emphasized that Canada legislated more stringent environmental 
regulations previous of the incorporation of Article 234. The preamble to the Act reads as 
follows: 
 
Navigation in coastal waters within Canadian jurisdiction north of latitude 
60°N is governed by the Artic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations 
(ASPPR), under the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The ASPPR deal 
with the construction of ships … Arctic Pollution Prevention Certificates … 
All vessels above 100 tons that navigate Canadian Arctic waters must comply 
with these regulations, including reporting requirements. 
 
The former Soviet Government (and now Russia’s) opinion is that Article 234 is a 
justification147 for strengthening control over its northern waters through the Regulations 
for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route. Soviet legislated more 
stringent environmental regulations after the incorporation of Article 234. The preamble 
to the Act reads as follows:   
 
Ensuring safe navigation and preventing, reducing … from vessels since the 
specifically severe climatic conditions that exists in the Arctic Regions and the 
presence of ice during the most part of the year bring about obstacles, or 
increased danger, to navigation while pollution of sea or the Northern Coast of 
the USSR might cause great harm to the ecological balance or … inflict 
damage … of the North peoples.148 
 
In addition to the two legislative acts, the IMO is currently endeavoring to operationalize 
Article 234 through the on-going development of a mandatory Polar Code.149 The now 
on-place voluntary Polar Guidelines150 is solely based on Article 234, as stated in the 
preamble of the code: 
 
The need to develop safety and pollution control guidelines specific to polar 
operations has been recognized by several of the Administrations principally 
affected, […] classification societies, by international organizations concerned 
with the polar environment, and by the United Nations itself. Clause 234 of the 
Law of the Sea Convention […] gives Coastal States with ice-covered areas the 
right […]151 
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The overall purpose of the Polar Code and Polar Guidelines is to harmonize commercial 
Arctic marine transport, and it is expected that the binding legal instrument [the Polar 
Code] will be in place around 2015-2016.152 
3.1.2 Sea Ice’s Undefined Legal Status 
In 1972 the Russian scholar Olenicoff described the Arctic Ocean as a vast and unique 
body of water, differing significantly from the rest of the ocean with the following words:  
 
Like the face of an alien planet, it stretches across the top of the world, its 
waters held captive by an ever-present mask of ice. It is the only ocean in the 
world that can be crossed on foot, but no man has ever dared to do so. Scores 
of ships have been mercilessly crushed by its guardian icefields, the same 
paradoxical masses of ice that benevolently provide island-size floating 
platforms for scientific research stations. Stirred slowly by storms winds and 
sea currents, this perpetually shifting jigsaw of drifting ice crumbles and 
merges, expands and contracts, like a restless, breathing beast.153  
 
Olenicoff’s impressionistic description of the Arctic’s permanent sea ice describes the 
difficulties when discussing its legal status. Hence, international law defining sea ice in 
its assorted forms remains incomplete and unclear.154 Due to the complexity of the 
matter, two different schools, or theories, of law has developed. Østreng has labeled these 
two theories as the ice-is-water theory and the ice-is-land theory.155 
 
The ice-is-water theory (mare liberum-res communis) 
According to Østreng, the ice-is-water theory recognizes that sea ice could be used for 
human purposes, and in some cases be the subject of occupation. However, due to sea 
ice’s constantly changing nature the prerequisites in international law for a permanent 
sovereign structure is not fulfilled, concluding that sea ice could never be an object of 
sovereign possession.156 According to Cinelli, the main weakness of considering glacies 
firma equal terra firma, “lay in the fact that the glacies could not, by their nature, be 
firma.“157 This is in line with Østreng’s view, stating that: “it is illogical to claim national 
sovereignty over an object that could melt and disappear from the face of the Earth. Ice is 
waters and will never be anything but water.“158  
 
The ice-is-land theory (glacies firma as terra firma-res nullius) 
Supporters of this theory claims that ice bears no resemblance to water. Instead, ice 
composes a solid substance which inter alia can be occupied and settled on by indigenous 
people for generations, perform as navigational barriers for vessels, and definite limits. 
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Ice can therefore not be subject for laws evolved for a liquid substance, instead it should 
subsist as territory.159 According to Timtchenko, the theory derives mainly from Soviet 
legal scholars since the NSR is covered by ice for about 10 months a year.160 Dunlap 
states that the academic reaction to the Russian scholar Martens rejection of equating ice 
with dry land in 1905 was the starting point for the ice-is-land theory supporters. Mainly 
these supporters argued that sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, and in particular the NSR are 
“inseparable from the land and should serve as the baselines for measuring the territorial 
sea.“161 However, Timtchenko reports that recent Soviet and Russian jurists seems to be 
in compliance with Martens position.162  
3.2 The Sector Theory  
In 1925 Canada claimed sovereignty over all islands situated between the Canadian 
mainland and the North Pole without formal requirements to acquisition of territory set 
out by international and customary law.163 Instead the claimed sovereignty was drawn by 
meridians of longitude and measured over a sector of the earth’s surface.164 The concept 
came to be known as the Sector Theory. This concept was soon adopted by the Soviet, 
who as the only Arctic State formally declared its claim to Arctic sovereignty in a 1926 
Decree,165 which reads as follows:  
 
All lands islands situated in the Arctic to the North, between the coastline of 
the USSR and the North Pole, both already discovered and those which may be 
discovered in the future, which at the time of the publication of the present 
decree are not recognized by the government of the USSR as the territory of 
any foreign State are hereby declared territory of the Union … between the 
meridian 32°4’35’’ longitude … and the meridian 168°49’30’’ longitude.166  
 
The fact that the Decree exclusively refers to lands and islands has adversarial been the 
starting point for a number of Soviet legal scholars claiming that the Decree also covers 
maritime territory according to Churchill.167 So is the case with Lakhtine’s interpretation 
in ‘Prava na severnye polyarnye prostranstva’ (Rights over the Arctic Regions) published 
in 1928, which according to Timtchenko was the first scholar who interpreted the Decree 
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to include marine areas.168 Later, the noted Russian scholar Korovin modified Lakhtine’s 
interpretation. According to Tymchenko, Korovin’s interpretation “insisted that the term 
lands and islands has to include also ice blocks and surrounding seas.“169 A likewise view 
is expressed by Nossova, who states “a broad reading of this Decree was favored … 
“islands and lands” as used in the Decree were considered to mean not only the 
continental land.“170 However, there is no evidence of state practice that the Soviet or 
Russian government have relied, or endorsed, this these scholars interpretations.171 
Although, as discussed later, the sector theory has been relied on when delineating 
maritime boundaries in the Arctic.172  
 
The sector theory’s legitimacy, function and applicability are interpreted in two different 
theories, which adds to the theory’s ambiguity in light of international law.173 First, the 
theory can be regarded as a modified version of the contiguity principle i.e., existing 
rights to claim sovereignty over areas with the foundation of propinquity of the claimant 
state to certain territories. The sector theory in this interpretation would provide each 
Arctic state complete jurisdiction covering all range of activities occurring as pie-shaped 
wedges bounded on the east and west by meridians of longitude merging at the North 
Pole.174 
 
Second, the theory’s legitimacy can be regarded as a legal instrument of delineating 
Arctic expanses subject for sovereignty claims, such as effective occupation. Østreng 
states that given this interpretation “the sector idea may be unobjectionable, if other 
elements in the situation are satisfactory.”175 
 
In addition, several other theories has tried to incorporate the sector theory in 
international law, such as the British international lawyer, M. F. Lindley - trying to link 
the sector theory to the hinterland theories.176 Nevertheless, these theories have never 
won any significant recognition.177 
 
The sector theory has not reached acceptance in international or customary law, although 
the Decree, and Russian legal scholars interpretations, has not been seriously challenged 
by other States.178 In addition, the sector theory has been used for delimitation.179 As 
Østreng notes: “this implies that the claim is regarded as a practical means of delimitation 
an area of sovereignty.”180 Although it is ambiguous what legal impact this infer since the 
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theory itself has been expressly rejected by the U.S., Denmark and Norway, among other 
states.181 In addition to the sector theory in the NSR, Canada has also previously invoked 
the theory in negotiations with the U.S. concerning the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary, 
as well as the Nunavut Boundary in the Inuvialuet Land Claim.182 However, by a speech 
held in August 2006 the Canadian Prime Minister definitely illustrated the Canadian 
abandonment from claiming Arctic sovereignty trough the sector theory with the 
following words:  
 
I am here today to make it absolutely clear that there is no question about 
Canada’s Arctic border. … All along the border, our jurisdiction extends 
outward 200 miles into the surrounding seas … No more. And no less.183 
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4 Legal Disputes & Controversies 
The previous chapter aimed to provide the reader with the necessary basic tools to 
understand the more complex nature of what will be discussed in the approaching 
chapters. This chapter will provide the reader with the core of the thesis and will solely 
focus on the actual legal disputes and controversies in the Arctic sea routes. The chapter 
is structured by dividing the legal disputes and controversies into the three Arctic sea 
routes examined. Due to the volume and range of the disputes and controversies, 
analyzing will be presented throughout this chapter to facilitate the outcome and 
conclusions in the more subjective forthcoming chapters.  
4.1 The Northern Sea Route 
4.1.1 Shipping in the High Seas of the Arctic –  
Subject to Russian Jurisdiction? 
As discussed in Chapter 2.3, the NSR is comprised by a multi series of temporary channels 
where marine Arctic transport are forced to use the channel that provides the best ice and 
navigational conditions. Further, Chapter 2.3.1 concluded that there is two definitions of the 
NSR, an official definition as found in Russian laws and regulations, and an unofficial 
definition, based on a functional approach of organizational and geopolitical criteria.  
In 1990 the Head Department of Navigation and Oceanography of the Soviet Ministry of 
Defence published the Decree ‘Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern 
Sea Route’.184 According to the Decree, the new regulations where composed in accordance 
with the Soviet Council of Ministers Decision No. 565 of 1 June 1990, as well as “with due 
regard to the relevant provisions of the Soviet legislation and rules of international law.”185 
Article 1.2 of the Decree reads as follows: 
The Northern Sea Route – national transportation route of the USSR, which is 
situated within the inland waters, territorial sea (territorial waters), or exclusive 
economic zone adjoining the USSR northern coast, and includes seaways 
suitable for guiding ships in ice. The extreme points … are the western Novaya 
Zemlya straits … and in the east, the Bering Strait.186 
According to the Decree, the official Russian definition of the NSR is a; - (i) coastal 
route consisting of internal as well as territorial waters of the Russian Federation, or - (ii) 
a high latitudinal route situated inside the Russian 200 NM EEZ boundaries, or - (iii) a 
combined route consisting of (i) and (ii). This definition implies that shipping in the high 
latitudinal route of the NSR would be a subject for Russian jurisdiction, despite its 
obvious violation of the high seas regime (see Chapter 2.3.1). 
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The Russian definition of the NSR has been subject to criticism amongst several maritime 
law scholars.187 In order to provide an extended explanation of the confusing definition, 
prominent Soviet/Russian lawyers, A. L. Kolodkin, former President of the Soviet 
Association of Maritime Law (hereinafter, “SAML”), and Dr. M. E. Volosov, former 
Chief Secretary of the Executive Committee of the SAML published an article in the 
leading journal of ocean policy studies. It provided a point of view, which has won some 
recognition in the international maritime law community.188   
Kolodkin and Volosov argued that Arctic States are obtruded with a special responsibility 
for preserving the Arctic ecosystem as well as its natural resources and therefore “the 
States of the region must possess certain privileges and prerogatives, above all with 
respect to regulating the access of users, including foreign users, and also with respect to 
comprehensive control over all types of activity carried on in the region.”189 
In summary, Kolodkin and Volosov claimed that, when discussing the legal status of the 
NSR, the certain characteristics and hydrographical factors of the region needs to be 
taken into account. Østreng’s interpretation of Kolodkin and Volosov’s article is of a 
similar view.190 Clearly, Kolodkin and Volosov wanted to create a sense that the NSR has 
certain special privileges due to its unique characteristics. 
Further, Kolodkin and Volosov states that: “the Arctic states may realize their powers in 
the region not only in accordance with international law, but also on the basis of national 
norms reflecting the complex history of Arctic exploitation.”191 
In conjunction with what has been cited above, the following statement in the article is 
highly provoking; 
But under any circumstances a significant part of the Northern Sea Route lies 
within the Soviet economic zone, or the territorial and even the internal waters 
of the USSR. The integral nature of the Northern Sea Route as a transport route 
is not affected by the fact that individual portions of it, at one time or another, 
may pass outside of the aforesaid boundaries where the USSR exercises its 
sovereign rights or sovereignty in full (i.e. it may pass into the high seas). This 
fact is supplemented by factors of an historical order. The contribution of the 
Russian and Soviet State to not merely the study, exploration and outfitting of 
the Northern Sea Route as a transport route, but also the entire polar region 
where continental and island territories of the Arctic belonging to the USSR are 
situated, is well known and internationally recognized. There is thus an 
aggregate of legal and other material circumstances which enable the Northern 
Sea Route to be relegated to the category of national transport routes.192  
Followed by;  
Having regard to this, one must conclude that the regulation of the navigation 
along the Northern Sea Route is the prerogative of the USSR as the coastal 
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State on this route.193  
Kolodkin and Volosov confirms that a part of the NSR positions outside the EEZ in de 
facto international waters, although pari passu claims that in case a vessels traverses 
seaways undisputedly under Russian jurisdiction, the NSR stretches “beyond its own 
economic zones in high latitudes.”194 In conclusion, Kolodkin and Volosov implies that 
all feasible Arctic sea routes south of the North Pole and across the North Pole, could be 
subject to Russian jurisdiction as a part of the NSR, with the prerequisite of the vessel 
previously traversed Russian coastal waters. 
Østreng, at the time the President of the Norwegian Scientific Academy for Polar 
Research, goes further and states that “in cases when the convoys are forced by sea ice to 
enter the high sea, prominent Soviet ocean law experts have claimed that the navigation 
lanes used are national and under full Russian control and jurisdiction.“195 
Kolodkin and Volosov’s interpretation of the definition has recently gained recognition in 
a Russian-Norwegian study published in 2007, confirming that voyages along the NSR 
are achieved by “coastal, marine, high-latitudinal and near-pole routes“ (see Figure 2.4), 
where “the fourth route, which is 700 miles shorter than the coastal route, passes the large 
circle across the geographical North Pole.”196 However, the study states that: “the most 
important factor appears to be … zones with the easiest ice conditions, regardless of 
whether they are encountered on coastal or high-latitudinal routes.”197 
 
Nevertheless, when defining the NSR in Chapter 2.3.1 and in conjunction with the law of 
the sea, it is clear that the near-pole routes do not necessary involve Russian internal 
waters, territorial waters, or the EEZ. 
 
It needs to be noted that the Russian-Norwegian report in 2007 was written in co-
operation with the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (hereinafter, “AARI”) of the 
Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of the Russian 
Federation. The Federal Service is one of the oldest and largest Russian research 
institutes in the field of comprehensive studies of the Polar Regions and has a significant 
role in Russia’s state affairs. 
 
In addition to Kolodkin and Volosov’s reasoning, other Soviet/Russian scholars have 
argued for  “extended geographical interpretations“198 of the NSR beyond the EEZ. 
According to Østreng, this approach of arguing has its foundation in the 1990 Decree, 
which contain the Russian concept of “marine areas adjacent.”199 It is unclear in Russian 
legislation whether this concept applies beyond the Russian EEZ or not. However, this 
reasoning has not reached any significant recognition in the maritime law community, but 
has added to the ambiguousness.  
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Nevertheless, as Østreng notes, Kolodkin and Volosov’s (and in some regard other 
scholars) interpretation of the NSR overlaps with the TSR and “coverers huge expanses 
of the high seas that according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(UNCLOS) is open to all nations and where ships are subject to flag state jurisdiction.”200 
This interpretation creates a sort of “creeping jurisdiction” in the NSR with undefined 
boundaries. Read in conjunction with the legal regime of the high seas (Chapter 2.3.1), it 
becomes obvious that this “creeping jurisdiction” is a palpable violation of the governing 
legal framework.  
4.1.2 The Right of Innocent Passage in the Northern Sea 
Route 
As noted in Chapter 3, the NSR is subject to the regime and principles of the Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea and UNCLOS, including sea expanses of the 
Soviet/Russian Arctic. However, certain special features have to be considered when 
discussing the concept of innocent passage in the NSR. Soviet and Russian state practice 
suggests that no right of innocent passage applies in its internal waters. This is a result of 
straight baselines as defined in the 1985 Decree. The Decree covered several archipelagos 
in the Soviet/Russian maritime Arctic. 
 
Kolodkin and Volosov claims that:  
 
Can one consider that the right of innocent passage through Soviet territorial 
waters in the Arctic, in instances where those waters include the Northern Sea 
Route, operates as has been established in the said conventions without any 
limitations? The answer is no, for certain additional factors operate here.201 
 
To summarize, Kolodkin and Volosov argues for certain special limits of innocent 
passage due mainly to two factors. Firstly, the NSR as a whole, irrespective of whether it 
passes through territorial waters, should be relegated to the category of national transport 
routes. The Norwegian Indreleia is such a route that encloses the entire route through 
straight baselines.202 This route has been confirmed by the ICJ in its judgment of 18 
December 1951 in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case, as well as in Norwegian 
legislation.203 The ICJ ruled that the entire sea route from Varangersfjorden to 
Porangersfjorden, irrespective of whether or not parts are within internal or territorial 
waters was exploited and equipped exclusively by Norway. Therefore it is under the 
complete control and administration of Norway.204 The ICJ ruled the Norwegian 
Indreleia to be “not a strait at all, but rather a navigational route prepared as such by 
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means of artificial aids to navigation provided by Norway.“205 According to Kolodkin 
and Volosov, the positive reply of the ICJ towards Norway in the Anglo-Norwegian 
fisheries case means that the prerequisites for a national transport route are “fully 
applicable to the USSR.”206 
 
The second factor proposed by Kolodkin and Volosov for limiting the right of innocent 
passage in the NSR is the enclosure of a number of Arctic areas by baselines drawn in 
accordance with the Decree of the Soviet Council of Ministers of 15 January 1985. 
Thereby a number of sea expanses around groups of islands, straits and other expanses 
have been linked with the mainland.207 As discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.1 regarding straight 
baselines, the legal consequence of the delimitation is that areas enclosed by baselines 
have become internal seawaters. This means that, in accordance with the general rule, the 
passage and navigation of foreign vessels therein is possible only with the authorization 
of the coastal State. In accordance with Article 5(2) of the Territorial Sea Convention, the 
enclosure of internal waters by straight baselines towards areas that previously was 
considered to be the high seas or territorial waters, would be a withdrawal of the right of 
innocent passage. However, Article 8(2) of UNCLOS establishes the same principle of 
preserving the right of innocent passage under the aforesaid method of calculating 
baselines, based on certain circumstances that are analyzed in Chapter 5.2. Due to this 
circumsances in a number of coastal areas including straits, it would seem that, the right 
of innocent passage in the NSR could be considered operative after the straight baselines 
have been drawn.  
 
Kolodkin and Volosov objects by stating that: 
 
It follows from the interpretation of an analogous decision taken by Canada on 
15 September 1985, which entered in force on 1 January 1986, on the baselines 
drawn around waters in the Northwest, including the Northwest Passage, that 
there never was a right of innocent passage in those waters (although as is well 
known American ships passed through those waters several times, the last 
being the Polar Sea in 1985). 208 
 
Followed by: 
 
The approach of Canada, in our view, corresponds also to the approach of the 
USSR, the more so since foreign ships have not passed through Soviet 
waters.209 
 
Kolodkin and Volosov correctly observes that Canada in 1985 objected to the traversing 
of the U.S. Coast Guard vessel Polar Sea in the NWP on the grounds that it was internal 
waters and the right of innocent passage did not exist (which Soviet publicly 
supported).210 However, as Dunlap notes - Canada has never ratified the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, therefore the Canadian 
claims in the NWP is established by customary law.211 Soviet/Russia who ratified the 
convention are therefore bound by Article 5(2) of the Convention, which “retains the 
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right of innocent passage through waters enclosed by straight baselines but previously 
considered to be high seas or territorial sea.“212 
4.1.3 “Arctic Ocean is Russian Territory” 
In the late summer of 2007 two privately funded Russian submarines planted a Russian 
titanium-flag under the North Pole on the Lomonosov Ridge at a depth of 4,300 
meters.213 On board the record-breaking dive were Dr. Arthur Chilingarov, a famous 
polar researcher, Doctor of Geography, and a hero of Soviet. During the dive, 
Chilingarov was the previous Deputy chairman of the State Duma, and in addition a close 
friend and associate to President Vladimir Putin.214 
 
Directly after the successfully dive – during the time Chilingarov, furthermore, was the 
Head of the Russian scientific program for the International Polar Year of 2007 – 
Chilingarov claimed that the purpose of the expedition was to prove that the “Arctic 
Ocean is Russian territory”, and “has always been Russian.”215 The statement in 
conjunction with Chilingarov’s influence in Russian politics, close connection with 
Vladimir Putin and prominence in Arctic science, made a large echo across the world. 
Canadian foreign minister, Peter McKay stated, “This isn’t the 15th century. You can’t go 
around the world and just plant flags and say: ‘We’re claiming this territory’.”216 Canada 
as well as Denmark claims the Lomonosov Ridge as part of their respective continental 
shelves, both States’ objecting to the claimed importance of planting the flag. However, 
Article 77(3) of UNCLOS clearly states that: “The rights of the coastal State over the 
continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any express 
proclamation.” 
 
Due to massive speculation of a rising cold war flourishing in the media, Chilingarov was 
forced to tone down his previous statements, claiming that “I am all for international 
cooperation in the Arctic.”217 In addition, Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov has 
stated that the flag planting was not an official act of the Russian State, and underscores 
that “Russia strictly abides by the norms and principles of international law and is firmly 
determined to act within existing international agreements and mechanisms.”218  
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4.1.4 Legal Disputes & Controversies Associated with 
the Sector Theory 
4.1.4.1 The Russian Sector Theory – Still Alive? 
On 1 October 1987 in Murmansk, Soviet leader Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev held a 
speech devoted to disputes in the Arctic region with different proposals for regional 
security and cooperation. He stated that:  
 
Depending on the evolution of the normalization of international relations … 
we could open the Northern Sea Route for foreign shipping subject to the use 
of our icebreaker pilotage.219 
 
This was a real breakthrough in the Soviet approach to the Arctic region, despite that the 
speech did not touch on the Soviet sector theory directly. However, the legal impact of 
Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech should not be underestimated. The speech influenced the 
process of redefining and grabbing a new approach to the sector theory among Soviet 
state bodies and lawyers of the Soviet Durma. Despite radical political changes in the 
Soviet during the mid 1980’s (the perestroika) the position on the Arctic, and in particular 
the sector theory, still remained unclear.  
 
Franckx claims that doubts concerning the Russian sector theory’s legal validation and 
official position is evident from the Annex to Issue 1 of the ‘1986 Notices to 
Mariners’.220 He states that the “inclusion of the sector degree in a maritime law context 
is somewhat unusual and even inappropriate, unless … the sector still serves a purpose in 
Soviet maritime law.”221 
 
The inclusion of the sector theory in the ‘1986 Notices to Mariners’ is also commented by 
Timtchenko, who notes that “The main idea of publishing the 1926 Decree in the Annex 
to Issue 1 of the Notices to Mariners of 1986 was to focus attention on this circumstance - 
in other words, to defend Soviet national interests in the territorial waters of the Arctic 
islands … the lack of clarity in Soviet policy; even today, after the collapse of the USSR, 
the official position of its successor – the Russian Federation – relating to the sector 
concept is still not clear.”222 
 
However, the real turnover was when R. Vartanov, A. Roginko, and V. Kolossov of the 
Russian Duma contended that the concept of a Russian sector theory in the Arctic as a 
foundation for territorial claims was obsolete when the ratification of the 1982 UNCLOS 
occurred.223 
 
Incidents outside the Kola Peninsula in 1992 and 1993 involving Russian and American 
submarines confirmed the Russian Government’s new approach. Russia did not refer to 
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the sector theory when responding to the incidents.224 In addition, the letter from V. 
Mikhaylichenko (who at the time was the Chief of the Administration of the NSR) to the 
Master of the Greenpeace vessel Solo traversing the NSR in 1992 indicates the new 
approach as well:  
 
We would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Regulations for 
Navigating on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route were officially 
published in Notices to Mariners No. 29 on July 13, 1991. To obtain 
permission for the navigation of your vessel Solo along the seaways of the 
Northern Sea Route, you had to send a request to the Administration … You 
would have obtained the permission for navigating along the Northern Sea 
Route, the date, the area of navigation, and the conditions of the ice pilotage 
after the expert examination of your vessel to define her correspondence to the 
Requirements for the Design, Equipment, and Supply of Vessels Navigating 
the Northern Sea Route.225 
 
There was no reference to the sector theory or the 1926 Decree in the letter. 
 
However, according to Østreng, there are still Russian scholars arguing that the 
Soviet/Russian sector theory “should be defined as an integral part of Russia with a 
vertex at the North Pole.“226 Mostly by referring to what Lakhtine stated in ‘Prava na 
severnye polyarnye prostranstva’ (Rights over the Arctic Regions) in 1928 (see Chapter 
3.2). 
 
Østreng states that the legal uncertainties and overall confused position by Russia, and 
Russian scholars, in relation to the sector theory and the NSR “is what other scholars 
have labeled creative ambiguity, feeling it to be deliberate and planned.”227  
 
After ratifying UNCLOS and departing from the Marxist-Leninist theory, this “creative 
ambiguity” has taken different directions becoming more in line with international law 
and accepted principles. An example of this was when Klimenko in 1987 argued that it is 
only those islands and archipelagos within the Soviet sector theory’s limits that belongs 
to the coastal state’s territory, despite the applicability of UNCLOS.228 Timtchenko (and 
several other Russian scholars) objected to Klimenko’s interpretation by claiming that: 
“the legal regime of the sea expenses is instead determined by the norms and principles of 
the law of the sea, which may be modified according to the special conditions of the 
region”.229 In addition, western scholars like Østreng comments Klimenko’s theory as a 
return to the foundation of the 1926 Decree, noting that:  
 
If one takes into account the characteristics of the Northern polar ocean and the 
juridical position of the circumpolar countries, one has to conclude that it is 
difficult to apply the high sea regime to these waters, and it is necessary to 
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apply some sort of restricted sovereignty of the polar states within their 
respective gravitation sectors.230 
 
In 1988 the Russian scholar V. Kulebyakin developed and modified Klimenko’s theory 
by reference to UNCLOS, Article 234 and partly citing the Russian scholar Korovin’s 
interpretation of the 1926 Decree (see Chapter 3.2).231 In brief, Kulebyakin argued that 
coastal states with sector claims have sovereignty rights over Arctic sea expanses, 
irrespective of land or sea territory. This is due to its unique ecological characteristics, 
and therefore not comparable to other sea expanses. According to Kulebyakin, Article 
234 would grant Arctic coastal States with these sovereignty rights. As discussed in 
Chapter 3.1.1.2, Article 234 entitles States in ice-covered waters to adopt and enforce 
non-discriminatory laws and regulations.232 Kulebyakin’s interpretation is similar to what 
Kolodkin and Volosov stated regarding the “creeping jurisdiction” in Chapter 4.1.1.  
 
However, despite the fact that Article 234 entitles extensive authority to coastal States in 
ice-covered waters, Kulebyakin’s argumentation and interpretation has been subject to 
criticism amongst several scholars within the international maritime law community.233 
Timtchenko notes that:  
 
It is doubtful that this article and CLOS as a whole contain legal grounds for 
the Sectoral concept. Kulebyakin’s arguments probably reflect the inertia of the 
old style of thinking rather than the real trends in the development of Soviet 
legal science.234 
 
Timtchenko’s view is also supported by Østreng, who claims that: “most international 
lawyers would probably agree with Leonid Timtchenko.“235 
 
In 1988 Canada’s leading scholar on the international law of the Arctic, Dr. Pharand, 
conducted extensive research on the sector theory. By researching and analyzing all 
different aspects of the theory; its origin, boundary treaties, customary law, and 
contiguity as the foundation for the sector theory Pharand’s conclusion was that:  
 
The 1825 and 1867 boundary treaties cannot serve as a legal basis for the 
sector theory … Contiguity is incapable of serving as a legal basis for the 
sector theory … the sector theory has not developed as a principle of 
customary law. This theory has no validity in international law for the 
acquisition of title, note even for land areas.236  
4.1.4.2 Soviet and Russian State Practice of Especial Interest 
Despite different doctrinal views regarding the NSR, it should be noted that the Soviet 
never officially has laid any territorial claims beyond its national jurisdiction based on the 
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sector theory.237 The 1926 Decree ‘On the Proclamation of Lands and Islands Located in 
the Northern Arctic Ocean as Territory of the USSR’ only targeted areas of land and 
disregarded the waters of the Soviet sector.238 In addition, the Soviet sectors littoral limits 
were never officially proclaimed as Soviet boundaries.239 This is illustrated by the 
response to U.S. military warships entering Soviet sectoral areas in 1957, 1963 – 65, and 
1967.240  
In the mid-1960’s the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard conducted several hydrographic 
research voyages in the high seas of Chukchi, East Siberian, Laptev, Kara and Barents 
Seas (see Figure 2.4). The research has latter been described as to challenge the legality 
of the Sector principle and to force Soviet to stress for revealing its position.241 Initially 
the Soviet did not respond to the U.S. activity. However, in 1964 the USS Burton Island 
undertook hydro- and oceanographic research in the Laptev and Sannikov straits of the 
East Siberian Sea. Soviet responded by declaring an aide-memoire dated 21 July 1964 
declaring that the Dmitri Laptev and Sanikov straits historically belong to Soviet. The 
straits could not be trans-navigated, as they were historically part of Soviet’s internal 
waters. The U.S. responded with the following message:  
Dmitrii, Laptev and Sannikov Straits … the United States is not aware of any 
basis for a claim to these waters on historic grounds even assuming that the 
doctrine of historic waters in international law can be applied to international 
straits.242  
The response by the U.S. confirms the possibility of applying a historic waters title to 
international straits, although clearly stating that the U.S. did not consider the Dmitrii 
Laptev and Sannikov straits to have the title of historic waters. However, the U.S. 
position, claiming that the Dmitrii Laptev and Sannikov were international straits is 
disputed, as it is clearly that the straits don’t meet the ‘functional criteria’ (see Chapter 
3.1.1.1 and Chapter 4.2.3) of an international strait.243  In 1967 the U.S. Coast Guard 
vessels Edisto and Eastwind assayed to traverse the Vil’kitskii strait (see Figure 2.4) 
when navigating the NSR. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to grant 
passage for the vessels on grounds that the Vil’kitskii strait was territorial waters of the 
Soviet. This was claimed to be in accordance with Soviet’s reservation to the Territorial 
Sea Convention, as well as the 1960 Statue on the on the Protection of the State Boundary 
of the USSR.244 The U.S. Coast Guard vessels did not pass the strait.  
It is worth noting the widely discrepancies between the Soviet doctrinal view in comparison 
to state practice. As evident, state practice has sufficiently been in compliance with 
international law. In addition, incidents with U.S. government vessels clearly show the 
Soviet’s intention and clarification of the legality regarding the sector theory. In fact, state 
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practice clearly shows that Soviet authorities have been consistent, despite legal 
uncertainties and different Soviet doctrinal views of the Soviet sector theory.245 
 
In negotiations between the Soviet and Norway, the relationship between the sector theory 
and UNCLOS was examined. Starting in 1974, negotiations concerning the delimitation of 
the Barents Sea including the continental shelf and the EEZ involved the sector theory. In 
total, the disputed maritime area roughly amounted to 155,000 km2 in the Barents Sea and 
another 20,000 square kilometers in the Arctic Ocean.246 Soviet argued for the recognition 
of the sector theory as a result of the unique characteristics of the area (i.e., geographic, 
geological, demographic, strategic, and climatic factors). It was also claimed that the sector 
theory “had gained such an administrative prescriptive title in Soviet practice that it carried 
a special psychological and political significance.”247 According to Russia, this justified a 
boundary line coinciding with the meridian of longitude 32° 04′ 35″ E (“the Russian sector 
line”). The Russian sector line was taken into account in the delimited maritime area 
governed by the Svalbard Treaty in 1920.248 Norway favored the 1982 UNCLOS default 
rule: a boundary line following the median line between the two respective coasts.249 
Figure 4.1 
The 2010 Agreement 
 
Source: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedl 
egg/Folkerett/100914_Kartskisse_final.pdf 
Finally, on September 15, 2010, the foreign ministers of Norway and Russia signed a 
treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. 
The “2010 Agreement” ended nearly four decades of extensive negotiations.250 The 
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agreement, “desiring to maintain and strengthen the good neighborly relations”,251 defines 
a single maritime boundary by dividing the two Arctic State’s continental shelves and 
EEZ’s in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. 
According to Timtchenko, the Russian ratification of UNCLOS “constitute a definite 
shift in the marine policy for the USSR towards the recognition of the common principles 
of the law of the sea.”252 The agreement concerning ‘Uniform Interpretation of the Rules 
of International Law Governing Innocent Passage’ signed on 23 September 1989 between 
the Soviet and the U.S. endorses this “definite shift” as well. Several scholars have stated 
that the agreement confirmed Soviet’s recognition of generally acknowledged 
international maritime law principles as applicable to the NSR.253 However, as evident 
above and latter discussed in the forthcoming chapters, Russia’s position and attitude 
towards the Arctic and the sector theory is still rather unclear.254 
4.2 The Northwest Passage 
4.2.1 Canada’s Historic Internal Waters 
In 1973 Canada declared “what is probably the most precise statement on the status and 
legal basis of the waters“ concerning the NWP.255 By a letter from the Canadian Bureau 
of Legal Affairs on the question of historic bays and waters in the Arctic Archipelago – 
Canada claimed the waters in the NWP to constitute historic internal waters.256 The letter 
declared that: “Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal waters of Canada, on historical 
basis, although they have not been declared as such in any treaty or by any legislation.“257 
 
Later, in May 1975, Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen announced 
a similar statement, emphasizing the non-applicable transit passage regime in the NWP. 
 
Canada’s Northwest Passage is not used for international navigation and since Arctic 
waters are considered by Canada as being internal waters, the régime of transit 
passage does not apply to the Arctic.258  
 
Not leaving any doubts of Canada’s position (all waters of the NWP’s Archipelago are 
Canadian historical internal waters) was the adoption of an Order-in-Council, establishing 
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straight baselines around the outer perimeter of the Archipelago in September 1985.259 
The purpose was to identify the outer limit of Canada’s claimed historic internal waters. 
In conjunction with this, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:  
 
These baselines define the outer limit of Canada’s historic internal waters. Canada’s 
territorial waters extend 12 miles seaward off the baselines.260 
 
It needs to be noted that there were previous government statements prior to the letter in 
1973. However, these statements have not gotten any widespread attention.261 According 
to Pharand, it was after the voyage of the U.S-flagged S/S Manhattan in 1969 the 
Canadian position was formed and articulated, mainly constituting that the NWP is 
comprised of internal waters.262 In 1970 the embassy of Canada communicated the 
following message to the U.S. Department of State as a response to the voyage:  
 
With respect to the waters of the Arctic Archipelago, the position of Canada has 
always been that these waters are regarded as Canadian … the Canadian 
Government cannot accept any suggestion that Canadian waters should be 
internationalized.263 
 
The U.S. has continuously declined and rejected Canada’s position after the embassy’s 
message in 1970.264 In 1986 an official letter from the U.S. State Department stated that:  
 
The United States position is that there is no basis in international law to support the 
Canadian claim. The United States cannot accept the Canadian claim because to do 
so would constitute acceptance of full Canadian control of the Northwest Passage and 
would terminate US navigation rights through the Passage under international law.265 
 
The European Community (hereinafter, “EC”) responded as well to Canada’s claim of 
Arctic waters being historic internal waters. The British High Commission Note of 1986 
reflects EC’s position, stating that: 
 
The Member States acknowledge that elements other than purely geographical ones 
may be relevant for purposes of drawing baselines in particular circumstances but are 
not satisfied that the present baselines are justified in general. Moreover, the Member 
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States cannot recognize the validity of a historic title as justification for the baselines 
drawn in accordance with the order.266 
 
When trying to determine the legal arguments of the two different opinions above, the 
natural starting point is what the ICJ stated in 1982 by the judgment of the Tunisia-Libya 
Continental Shelf Case.267 The Court stated that neither UNCLOS nor the Convention on 
the Territorial Sea provided any guidance when historic waters exist, instead the position 
is governed by customary law.268 The Court stated that: 
 
It is clearly the case that, basically, the notion of historic rights or waters and that of 
the continental shelf are governed by distinct legal régimes in customary international 
law.269 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.1, UNCLOS I requested by a resolution to the UN for a 
study with the purpose of determining the juridical regime of historic waters and historic 
bays.270 The UN Secretariat published such a study in 1962, outlining three criteria for 
assessing historic internal waters. It reads as follows: 
 
In determining whether or not a title to “historic waters” exists, there are three 
factors which have to be taken into consideration, namely,  
 
(i) The authority exercised over the area by the State claiming it as “historic waters”; 
(ii) The continuity of such exercise of authority; 
(iii) The attitude of foreign States.  
 
First, effective exercise of sovereignty over the area by the claiming State is a 
necessary requirement for title to the areas as “historic waters” of that State. 
Secondly, such exercise of sovereignty must have continued during a considerable 
time so as to developed into a usage. Thirdly, the attitude of foreign States to the 
activities of the claiming State in the area must have been such that it can be 
characterized as an attitude of general toleration.  
The burden of proof of title to “historic waters” is on the State claiming such title, in 
the sense that, if the State is unable to prove to the satisfaction of whoever has to 
decide the matter that the requirements necessary for the title have been fulfilled, its 
claim to the title will be disallowed.271 
 
Despite the study, it is important to emphasize that it has not lead to any international 
legislative action, therefore the position is, as expressed by the ICJ, governed by 
customary international law. However, The United States Supreme Court has applied the 
studies criteria regarding historic waters in numerous internal U.S. Cases on historic 
waters, such as US v. Louisiana (1969) and US v. Alaska (1975).272 According to 
Churchill and Lowe, the ruling by the ICJ in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute273 asserts that the UN Secretariat study’s criteria for historic bays “were 
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implicitly accepted by the international Court.”274 However, this is not confirmed by case 
law.275 It is important to note that circumstances and factors when evaluating historic 
waters in the legal doctrine are largely different than the actual application of the vague 
and undetermined customary law to a specific situation. The process is difficult and still 
rather unclear.276 As Simmons states:  
 
The supposed international legal rules are in any event vague and difficult to 
apply in practice because the basic requirements for proving historic title to 
waters derived from international customary law … the supposed three rules – 
formal claim, continuous and effective exercise of relevant jurisdiction, and 
international acquiescence … received the imprimatur of approval in the 
international legal context … but unfortunately, the ICJ’s reference … for 
historic waters … merely muddies the already unclear rules at customary law 
relating to historic bays.277 
 
McDorman has also commented the study, he notes that: “there is a uncertainty whether 
each of the three criteria must be meet independently or whether what is involved is more 
of a balancing of the factors “.278  In conclusion, it can be stated that the international 
legal rules governing historic waters are vague and undetermined with no case law to rely 
on.  
4.2.2 Straight Baselines as a Basis for Internal Waters 
Canada adopted legislation for the establishment of straight baselines in September 1985. 
As concluded in Chapter 3.1.1.1, a State can draw straight baselines including bays and 
island to “simplify” the coastline, stipulating the waters on the landward side to become 
internal waters.279 Since Canada during the time280 was not a party to the Territorial Sea 
Convention nor UNCLOS, the establishment of straight baselines was based on 
customary law, as mainly interpreted by, and in pursuant to, the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries case of 1951.281 In the case, the ICJ formulated three criteria for drawing 
straight baselines:  
 
(1) the general direction of the coast, 
(2) the close link between land and sea, and 
(3) certain economic interests evidenced by long usage282 
 
Criteria (1), and (2) are mandatory whilst criteria (3) is optional.283 The three criteria 
were later legislated (without any modification) into Article 4 of the Territorial Sea 
Convention and Article 7 of UNCLOS.  
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Quickly after Canada’s proclamation of drawing straight baselines in the NWP, two 
formal protests by letter were received. The first from the U.S., stating that: 
 
On September 10, 1985, the Government of Canada claimed all the waters 
among the Arctic islands as internal waters, and drew straight baselines around 
the Arctic islands to establish its claim. The United States position is that there 
is no basis in international law to support the Canadian claim.284  
 
The second letter came from the member states of the EC, through the British High 
Commission stating that “The member States acknowledges that elements other than 
purely geographical ones may be relevant for purposes of drawing baselines in particular 
circumstances but are not satisfied that the present baselines are justified in general.“285  
 
Despite the formal protest by the U.S. and the EC, Canada’s straight baselines are widely 
acknowledged among scholars and States. Based under customary law, the Canadian 
claim is well substantiated.286 According to Pharand, the drawn straight baselines meet 
the compulsory first criteria (1) as stated by the ICJ in the Anglo–Norwegian Fisheries 
case - the general direction of the coast. The second criteria, (2) the close link between 
the land and sea is also fulfilled. In addition, the third criteria, (3) certain economic 
interests evidenced by long usage is supported by the fact that historical regional interests 
and needs of the Canadian Inuit.287   
 
Pharand’s profound research and analysis of Canada’s straight baselines has strong 
international recognition among the maritime law community.288 In a review on his 
research on straight baselines and its application to Canada’s Arctic Archipelago (NWP), 
Pharand concludes that:  
 
1. The straight baseline system is not an exception to the general low-water 
mark rule along the coast to measure the breath of territorial sea, but rather 
the application of that general rule to a specific case. 
2. The straight baseline system may be used where a coast is bordered by an 
archipelago such as the skjaergaard under customary law, whereas under 
conventional law the use of that system is limited to a fringe of islands. 
3. The Canadian Arctic Archipelago qualifies for the use of straight baselines 
under customary law, but it also might qualify under conventional law. 
4. The straight baselines drawn along the edge of the Archipelago meet the 
compulsory criteria of the general direction of the coast and the close link 
between the land and the sea. In addition, the validity of baselines across 
Lancaster Sound and Amundsen Gulf is supported by the historic regional 
interests and needs of the Inuit. 
5. There is no maximum length for straight baselines, but it appears obvious 
that Canada made an effort to restrict the baselines to whatever lengths 
resulted from the normal application of the relevant criteria.  
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6. The international validity of the straight baselines is further supported by a 
consolidation of title to the waters of the Archipelago generally and those 
of Amundsen Gulf, Lancaster Sound, and Barrow Strait in particular. 
7. The Waters enclosed by straight baselines have the status of internal 
waters.289  
4.2.3 NWP – a Strait Used for International Navigation? 
As noted above, in 1969 the US-flagged oil tanker S/S Manhattan traversed the NWP 
from east to west without seeking Canada’s permission. The voyage clearly indicated the 
U.S. perspective that the NWP is a strait used for international navigation when defining 
its international legal status.290 Prior to the voyage, the NWP had been a traversed by 
government vessels such as the U.S. nuclear powered submarines Seadragon in 1960 and 
Skate in 1962.291 However, the S/S Manhattan’s unique mission was to determine the 
feasibility of year-round navigation for commercial marine Arctic transport in the NWP. 
Moreover, the voyage constituted a U.S. statement regarding concerns of navigational 
rights in key water effects, sprung out of a newly desire from several coastal states 
(including Canada) to push the traditional three NM territorial sea to twelve NM.292 The 
U.S. publically asserted its position in a very clear way, declaring that: “We cannot 
accept the assertion of a Canadian claim that the Arctic waters are internal waters of 
Canada … Such acceptance would jeopardize the freedom of navigation essential for 
United States naval activities worldwide.”293 
 
At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in the 1970’s the subject of passage 
through straits positioned the major naval Powers on one side and coastal States 
controlling narrow straits on the other side.294 Negotiations on the strait regime lead to 
acceptance of the new concept of transit passage - strongly pushed for by the U.S.295 
During the conference, the U.S. “made clear its view that the Northwest Passage was a 
strait used for international navigation through which a right of transit passage 
existed.”296 This statement has been repeated several times, for a more modern example, 
see the 1994 commentary on UNCLOS sent by President Clinton to the U.S Senate.297 
 
Canada however has been immovable in their position that “Canada’s Northwest Passage 
is not used for international navigation and since Arctic waters are considered by Canada 
as being internal waters, the régime of transit passage does not apply to the Arctic”, as 
stated by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen in May 1975.298 In 
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addition, during the negotiations at the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Allan 
MacEachen, now Foreign Minister, repeatedly stated that the NWP was comprised by 
internal waters of Canada and the concept of transit regime did not apply.299 The EC 
publicly disagreed with the Canadian viewpoint, but at the same time did not publicly 
support the U.S. perspective (strait used for international navigation where transit passage 
rights exists).300 It should be noted that no other State has officially endorsed the U.S. 
perspective.301 
 
However, the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea managed to agree on a legal 
regime regarding “straits used for international navigation”. Unfortunately, no definition 
of such a strait was agreed upon.302 Article 34 of UNCLOS reads as follows:  
 
1. The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation 
established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the 
waters forming such straits or the exercise by the States bordering the straits of 
their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air space, bed and 
subsoil. 
2. The sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the straits is 
exercised subject to this Part and to other rules of international law. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.1, since UNCLOS do not read out the requirements of use 
to transform, for an example, the M’Clure Strait (see Figure 2.5) into an international 
strait, customary law needs to be depended on, mainly as interpreted and practiced in the 
Corfu Channel case of 1949.303  
 
In the case the ICJ ruled out two criteria for an international straight: geographic and 
functional. The geographic criteria is fulfilled when there is an “overlap of territorial 
waters in the natural passage between land joining two parts of the high seas (or EEZ) or 
one part of the high seas (or EEZ) with the territorial sea of a foreign state.”304 According 
to Pharand, the geographic criteria is fulfilled in the NWP.305 Of more crucial factor is the 
functional criteria, which concerns the required degree of use for international navigation. 
As previously noted, there are no provisions to fall back on in neither the Territorial Sea 
Convention nor UNCLOS, therefore the functional criteria is relied upon customary law. 
Considering the Corfu Channel Case, Pharand concludes that: “before a straight may be 
considered international, proof must be adduced that it has a history as a useful route for 
international maritime traffic.”306 This interpretation is also in line with the view declared 
by the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, stating that: “any legal strait to which 
a special regime as regards navigation applies under international law because the strait is 
substantially used by shipping proceeding from one part of the high seas to another.“307 In 
order for the functional criteria to be fulfilled the sufficiency of the use is determined by 
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two factors: the number of transits and the plethora of flags represented. This 
interpretation is in line with several Arctic scholars.308 Pharand has summarized and 
classified all transits passages in the NWP from 1902 to 2005 and states that “it is evident 
that the Northwest Passage has not had a history as a useful route for international 
maritime traffic.”309  However, scholars like Østreng has expressed that due to climate 
change in the Arctic foreign commercial Arctic marine transport most likely will 
increase, leading to a possibility of sufficient traffic to redefine the prerequisites of the 
functional criteria.310 This future scenario is elaborated with in Chapter 6. 
 
Nevertheless, the U.S. perspective is unequivocal though; “a straight used for 
international navigation” covers all straits that are capable of being used for international 
navigation.311 This implicitly argues on the existence of the functional criteria. However, 
the key wording from the Corfu Channel case is:  
 
It may be asked whether the test [whether a waterway is an international 
strait] is to be found in the volume of traffic passing through the Strait or in its 
greater or lesser importance for international navigation. But in the opinion of 
the Court the decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation as 
connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for 
international navigation. Nor can it be decisive that this Strait [Corfu 
Channel] is not a necessary route between two parts of the high seas, but only 
an alternative passage between the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. It has 
nevertheless been a useful route for maritime traffic.312 
 
Clearly not favorable in the U.S. point of view.  
4.2.4 The Right of Innocent Passage in the NWP 
As previously noted in Chapter 4.2.2, the waters of the NWP are very likely to be 
regarded as internal waters due to the enclosure by straight baselines in 1985. In concise, 
there are three main reasons for the fact that the right of innocent passage not applies in 
the NWP. First, the waters enclosed by straight baselines were ensued through, and in 
accordance with, customary law since Canada not being a party to the Territorial Sea 
Convention. Second, the innocent passage provision, Article 5(2), of the Convention had 
not been developed to customary law by state practice in 1958.313 Third, Canada ratified 
UNCLOS in 2003, approximately 20 years after the enclosure by straight baselines in the 
NWP being binding according to customary law. As noted in Chapter 3.1.1.1, Article 
8(2) of UNCLOS states that:  
 
Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method 
set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which 
had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as 
provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters. 
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Due to the extensive time elapse between the enclosure of straight baselines and Canada’s 
ratification of UNCLOS, it is evident that the waters had obtained the status of internal 
waters. The UNCLOS cannot apply retroactively.314 In conclusion, it can be firmly stated 
that the NWP is not subject to the right of innocent passage regime for foreign 
commercial marine transport.  
4.2.5 Agree to Disagree – the 1988 Agreement 
The implementation of the 1988 Canada–United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement, 
which covers the transit of U.S. icebreakers, has been fairly satisfactory.315 A request for 
permission and prior authorization has taken place for each of the five transits conducted in 
the NWP since 1988. However, there are two important shortcomings in the agreement 
which must be remedied: first, it applies only to icebreakers; and second, it contains an 
implied, but very clear, refusal by the U.S. to recognize Canada’s claim. No commercial US-
flagged vessel has traversed the NWP claiming waters are under the legal regime of a strait 
used for international navigation.316 The agreement contains a notwithstanding clause, 
stating that: “Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavor between Arctic neighbors 
and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments 
of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or 
their respective positions regarding third parties.”317 
 
As of January 2009, George W. Bush issued a presidential directive symbolizing the 
traditional U.S. position:  
The Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and the 
Northern Sea Route [north of Russia] includes straits used for international 
navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those 
straits. Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and over flight 
in the Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these rights through- out 
the world, including through strategic straits.318 
The successful implementation of the agreement can be the inclusion of Article 234. This 
provision constitutes a definitive shift of the U.S. policy towards the Canadian 
environmental protection zone (AWPPA), as seen in the commentary of the negotiations of 
the 1982 UNCLOS.319 The U.S. stated, (and accepted) that Article 234 being part of 
international customary law and is now in support for Canada’s Arctic Waters legislation.320 
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In addition, the U.S. has recognized that Canadian standards and requirements of the 
AWPPA are applicable to U.S. commercial vessels.321 In 2009, Canada extended the 
AWPPA zone to 200 NM.322 
4.3 The Transpolar Sea Route  
The TSR, unlike the NWP and the NSR, has a special status as the only Arctic sea route 
outside any Arctic State’s territorial jurisdiction. As previously discussed in Chapter 
2.3.3, the TSR’s distance of approximately 2,100 NM323 characterize the TSR to be the 
shortest of the three Arctic sea routes. Unlike the NSR and NWP (which are considered 
coastal routes), the TSR represent a mid-ocean route across, or near, the North Pole.  
 
The TSR comprises limited jurisdictional controversies and uncertainties. According to a 
research report by the European Parliament, it is not unlikely that commercial Arctic 
marine transport will focus on traversing the TSR to avoid complications stemming from 
national jurisdiction in the NSR and the NWP.324 Situated outside the geographical reach 
of any Arctic coastal State, marine transport on the TSR is subject for the high seas 
regime (see Chapter 3.1.1.1.). However, given particular interpretations by Russian 
scholars, the TSR might be affected for what has been labeled as “creeping jurisdiction” 
from the NSR (see Chapter 4.1.1).  
 
Nonetheless, Arctic marine transport in the TSR is subject for the legal framework as 
described in Chapter 3. In addition, other Conventions apply as well, such as IMO’s two 
main treaties, SOLAS 1974 and MARPOL 1973/1978. Moreover, the COLREG 1972, 
London Convention 1972 and STCW Convention 1978/1995 are also applicable, to 
mention a few.325  
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5 Comparative Analysis  
In this Chapter the reader will be presented with a comparative analysis of the Arctic 
marine transport related legal disputes and controversies in the three Arctic sea routes. 
The reader should here also note that it is important to bear in mind that all disputes and 
controversies are interrelated. Focus of this chapter is to identify and analyze 
similarities, differences, and commonalities. In addition, the author’s own analysis will 
be presented. Consequently the Chapter will serve as an end-conclusion for some 
disputes and controversies.  
5.1 Commonalities  
Subject to Applicable Law 
Firstly, it needs to be emphasized from the outset that marine transport conducted on the 
NSR, NWP, and TSR in the Arctic Ocean are subject to an intricate multi-layered 
framework. The 1982 UNCLOS is the most prominent, followed by the 1958 Territorial 
Sea Convention and the substantive standards and obligations incorporated in several 
IMO instruments (see Chapter 3 & 4.3). This jurisdictional framework sets out the basic 
rights and obligations for the Arctic coastal states, as well as jurisdiction over vessels’ 
traversing the Arctic sea routes. In addition, the voluntary Polar Guidelines might soon be 
developed into a mandatory International Code of Safety for Ships in Polar Waters.326 
Depending on a vessel’s geographic position in either the NSR or the NWP as situated in 
the Arctic basin, the vessel will also be subject for coastal state’s national jurisdiction. 
 
The New Accessible Arctic 
Without further commenting the scientific process of climate change, it has been 
concluded previously in Chapter 2.2.1 that today’s Arctic ice coverage is less than 1,4 
million km2 than in 2006.327 Going back even further, the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment states that todays ice coverage is roughly at a 50 percent decrease compared 
to the 1950’s ice coverage.328 From a factual viewpoint, the thawing of Arctic ice 
coverage has enabled a previously inaccessible maritime area for excavation of 
hydrocarbons and other resources. It has also exposed new shipping routes decreasing the 
distance between the three most industrialized and developed continents on Earth.329 In 
addition, new technologies for vessels and drilling structures can easier cope with the 
Arctic’s harsh environment. The new accessible Arctic affects all three Arctic shipping 
routes within the scope of this thesis.  
 
Different Geographic Definitions of the Arctic 
As concluded in Chapter 1.5.2, there are different geographic definitions for the term 
“Arctic”, since neither the Arctic nor the Arctic Ocean has a definitive or obvious extent. 
Since no single definition exists of what is meant by the Arctic, definitions are varied 
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according to the field of interest from which the Arctic is being viewed, with each sub-
category comprised of even more varied definitions.330 Different geographic definitions 
of the Arctic affect the three sea routes within the scope of this thesis, although the 
consequences are strongly tinged by ambiguity and vague predictions in the legal 
doctrine. Therefore this commonality cannot be further commented.    
5.2 Similarities 
Increase of Arctic Sovereignty Through Article 234 
As discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.2, Article 234 of UNCLOS allows coastal states to enact 
rules and regulations to protect ice-covered waters within their EEZ. The NSR and the 
NWP both share the same strengthening of control over their respective sea routes 
through domestic legislation with its legal foundation in Article 234. The TSR stands 
outside of its scope. In the NSR the Russian legislation ‘Regulations for Navigation of the 
Seaways of the Northern Sea Route’, clearly states it has taken its justification from 
Article 234 by stating that:  
 
Purposes of ensuring safe navigation and preventing … from vessels since the 
specifically severe climatic conditions that exists in the Arctic Regions and the 
presence of ice331   
 
As well as in the NWP by Canada’s preamble to the AWPPA. Stating:  
 
Canada’s responsibility … of the peculiar ecological balance that now exists in 
the water, ice and land areas of the Canadian arctic332 
 
However, it is important to note, that Canada established its AWPPA before Article 234 
came into force. According to Franckx, Canada’s opinion is that “ the article now gives 
international acceptance to the AWPPA.“333 In comparison to the NSR, Canada in the 
NWP was the pusher for Article 234’s enactment during the third Law of the Sea 
Conference.334 This distinction between the NSR and the NWP is worth highlighting.  
 
Nevertheless, the end-result is similar. The strengthening of Arctic-control in the NSR 
and the NWP is clearly manifested by the traversing of the NSR in 1992 by the French 
vessel L’Astrolabe. The Finish vessels in 1997, Uikku and Lunni, made a similar voyage 
in the NWP. Through Article 234, Canadian and Russian domestic legislation required 
the traversing vessels to be in compliance with the AWPPA and ‘Regulations for 
Navigation of the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route’. All the vessels’ owners agreed to 
be in compliance with these regulations.335 
 
The U.S. has objected to Canada’s AWPPA in the 1970’s, but there seems to be a lack of 
formal objection/protests against the Russian ‘Regulations for Navigation of the Seaways 
of the Northern Sea Route’. This confirms the “U.S. policy shift” (see Chapter 4.2.5) of 
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measures to be made for marine environmental protection, as stated by the U.S. during 
the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.  
 
The U.S. has avoided making a formal statement of its interpretation on Article 234.336 It 
is unclear whether the U.S. reluctance to formally state a position is de facto an 
acceptance of the provision as a part of customary law or not, although some authors has 
suggested so.337 The closest is a clarification on the U.S. position regarding transit 
passage in conjunction with Article 234 that was stated in the commentary to the third 
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which read: “Article 234 does not fundamentally 
affect transit passages rights through an international straight.“338 It should be noted that 
UNCLOS does not clarify whether or not transit passage prevails over Article 234 or vice 
versa. This question is elaborated with in the forthcoming chapter. As concluded in 
Chapter 3.1.1.2, Article 234 is a controversial establishment with several ambiguities, 
such as the provisions legal definitions of “ice-covered passage” and “most of the 
year”.339 This ambiguity affects Arctic marine transport in the NSR, the NWP, and in 
some extent the TSR. Given the driving forces behind the new accessible and commercial 
Arctic as provided in Chapter 2.2, there is an on-going process by the IMO to 
operationalize Article 234 through the mandatory Polar Code. The aim is to clarify and to 
reach consensus regarding rules and regulations in the Arctic for commercial vessels. 
However, the relevance and scope of the instrument is still uncertain since it is not yet 
legally binding. It is expected to enter into force by 2014-2016.340 The Polar Code will 
ensure that the same set of standards, regulations, and rules will apply to Arctic shipping 
along the NSR, the NWP and the TSR.  
 
It is worth noting that the implementation of a mandatory Polar Code based on Article 
234, in order to harmonize Arctic shipping, will in some ways contradict with the 
Canadian AWPPA and the Russian ‘Regulation for Navigation of the Seaways of the 
Northern Sea Route’. Despite the Polar Codes uncertain legal range, it will most certainly 
imply a jurisdictional decrease of Artic sovereignty in the NSR and the NWP. Slightly 
controversial since the “Arctic exception clause” original purpose was “to provide the 
Canadian Government with international support … of its northern waters and to bolster 
its claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.“341 
 
The Undefined Legal Status of Sea ice 
As concluded in Chapter 3.1.2, Østreng and Cinelli claims there are two theories; the ice-
is-water theory (mare liberum-res communis), and the ice-is-land theory (glacies firma as 
terra firma-res nullius). In summary, it can be concluded that the dispute of the undefined 
legal status of sea ice is applicable to the NSR, the NWP and in some extent the TSR 
(depending on which sub-theory of the “ice-is-land theory” is applied). However, as of 
today the legal status of sea ice does not seem to be central for maritime law scholars. 
The definitive doctrinal shift internationally was the statement from the Russian scholar 
Martens in 1905 (see Chapter 3.1.2). The Russian legal expert on the NSR, Timtchenko, 
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has reported that Martens opinion on the legal status of sea ice “is typical of more recent 
Soviet and Russian jurists.“342 The author of this thesis is of the opinion that the “ice-is-
land theory” is too farfetched, mainly due to considering glacies firma equal terra firms is 
illogical since glacies by nature are not firma. Therefore this dispute will not be further 
analyzed. 
5.3 Differences  
Innocent Right of Passage  
As stated in Chapter 4.1.2, innocent passage in the NSR was previously non-applicable 
due to legislation and state practice exerted by the Soviet/Russia. Nevertheless, the 
ratification of UNCLOS constituted a definitive shift of the maritime approach for Soviet 
and was a recognition of the concept and principles of the Law of the Sea. The signing of 
the treaty, ‘Uniform Interpretation of the Rules of International Law Governing Innocent 
Passage’ (a.k.a. the “Jackson Hole Agreement”), between Soviet and the U.S. in 1989 
confirms Soviet’s acceptance of the principles of innocent passage.343 However, for those 
straits enclosed by straight baselines drawn pursuant to Article 7 of UNCLOS, or Article 
4 of the Territorial Sea Convention the application of the right to innocent of passage is 
more complex. Parts of the sea previously regarded as internal waters are, according to 
Article 8, UNCLOS, and Article 5 of the Territorial Sea Convention, not subject to 
innocent or transit passage rights. Waters previously not regarded as internal waters are 
therefore subject to the right of innocent passage according to Article 8(2) UNCLOS, and 
Article 5(2) of the Territorial Sea Convention.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.1, defining the previous (and in some regard their present) 
legal status of straits, which now have been enclosed by straight baselines, is difficult and 
subject to much ambiguity in the legal doctrine.344 One must first ascertain how those 
waters were regarded prior to the establishment of straight baselines. For the NSR, it is 
crucial to look at the sector theory, the “ice-is-land theory” (mare liberum-res 
communis), the doctrine of historic waters, Soviet and Russian state practice, and the 
question if the NSR could be regarded as a national transportation route, such as the 
Norwegian Indreleia.345 This is in line with the opinion of the Soviet/Russian scholars 
Kolodkin and Volosov, who stated “can one consider the right of innocent passage 
through Soviet territorial waters … the answer is no, for certain additional factors operate 
here.“346 (See Chapter 4.1.2).  
 
These factors have been analyzed along with their legal validity in the context of 
international law. To summarize, it is clear that there is no strong argument that straits in 
the NSR were regarded as internal waters previous of their enclosure by straight baselines 
in 1985.347  
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Kolodkin and Volosov argue in favor of relegating the NSR as a national transportation 
route, such as the Norwegian Indreleia. However, as seen previously, Soviet/Russia has 
never officially made such a claim.348 Therefore this argument is irrelevant, irrespective 
of whether or not the ICJ’s ruling in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case is fully 
applicable to the NSR (see Chapter 4.1.2). Secondly, Kolodkin and Volosov argues:  
 
It follows from the interpretation of an analogous decision taken by Canada on 
15 September 1985, which entered in force on 1 January 1986, on the baselines 
drawn around waters in the Northwest, including the Northwest Passage, that 
there never was a right of innocent passage in those waters (although as is well 
known American ships passed through those waters several times, the last 
being the Polar Sea in 1985). 349 
 
Kolodkin and Volosov fails to note that Canada never ratified the Territorial Sea 
Convention and the fact that Canada based its straight baselines on customary law 
(Chapter 4.2.2 & 4.2.4). Soviet/Russia ratified the Convention and is therefore bound by 
Article 5(2).350 This means that Russia in the NSR are bound to respect the innocent 
passage right for foreign marine transport through waters in the NSR which now are 
enclosed by straight baselines but previously considered to be high seas or territorial 
sea.351 
 
In the NWP however, the situation is different. As concluded in Chapter 4.2.4, there are 
three main reasons that the right of innocent passage does not apply in the NWP. Some 
scholars have suggested that Canada acceding to UNCLOS meaning de facto an 
obligation to abide and respect Article 8(2) (the right of innocent passage). However, as 
discussed above, the right of the innocent passage regime cannot change an established 
legal status due to the retroactive effect, although it needs to be noted that there are some 
uncertainty in the legal doctrine in this regard.352 
 
In summary, it can be concluded that the unconditional innocent right of passage for 
foreign marine Arctic transport is in general applicable to the NSR, including strait 
previously closed by straight baselines. The TSR stands out of the innocent passage 
regime’s scope due to its geographic position. In the NWP, there exists some ambiguity, 
although most scholars tend to lean on Pharand’s interpretation. This interpretation is also 
the author of this thesis’s view. However, given the driving forces behind the new 
accessible and commercial Arctic as provided in Chapter 2.2 this interpretation may be 
subject for change, as discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
Historic Title as a Basis for Internal Waters in the Arctic Sea Routes  
As concluded in Chapter 4.1.1 and 4.2.1, neither the Territorial Sea Convention nor 
UNCLOS defines the controversial and ambiguous concept of waters subject to historic 
title. However, both Conventions confirm (recognizes) the concept’s possible application 
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in two situations.353 Given what has been concluded above, it can be determined that the 
doctrine of historic waters is subject to customary law, which as discussed in Chapter 
3.1.1.1 is vague, controversial and in most cases indeterminate.354  
 
In the NSR neither Soviet nor Russia has ever officially claimed any of the Arctic seas 
based on the doctrine of historic waters.355 However, neither Soviet nor Russia has openly 
rejected these claims.356 According to Timtchenko, Soviet legal scholars have argued for 
such claims as recently as in the 1980’s.357 In addition, (as described in Chapter 4.1) the 
necessary domestic legal framework was provided to espouse such a claim in the 
future.358 This has added to the ambiguity on the Soviet/Russian position. Irrespective 
whether or not the doctrine of historic waters could applicable for waters in the NSR, this 
cannot be further legally evaluated since no official claim exist.   
 
In comparison to the NSR, the NWP has been subject to claims based on historic title. 
Canada’s first official claim of a historic title as a basis for internal waters was made in 
1973. The Bureau of Legal Affairs stated that: “Canada also claims that the waters of the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal waters of Canada, on historical basis, although 
they have not been declared as such in any treaty or by any legislation.“359 Most research 
of Canada’s claim to a historic title as a basis for internal waters in the NWP has been 
conducted by Pharand, who state that “the best definition of historic waters today is the 
one given by L. J. Bouchez,”360 followed by Pharand’s interpretation of those three basic 
requirements set out by Bouchez: “(i) exclusive exercise of state jurisdiction, (ii) a long 
lapse of time, and (iii) acquiescence by foreign states.“361 As discussed in Chapter 4.2.1, 
Pharand’s conclusion reads as follows:  
 
Canada is not in a position to discharge its heavy burden of proof that it has 
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over the Arctic waters for a sufficiently long 
period of time and with the acquiescence of foreign states, particularly those 
primarily affected by its claim.362  
 
The author of this thesis, mainly due to the following three specific arguments, shares 
Pharand’s opinion. Firstly, the official claim by Canada in 1973, in light of relevant case 
law (as analyzed in Chapter 4.2), does not fulfill Pharand’s second requirement - (ii) the 
long laps of time. As stated in the Tunisia/Libya Continental shelf case by the ICJ: 
“historic title must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by long 
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usage.“363 In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case the length of usage was roughly 250 
years, where the Norwegian government relied upon “the exclusive privilege to fish and 
hunt whales granted at the end of the 17th century.“364  
 
Secondly, the U.S. as well as the EC directed protests against Canada directly after 
Canada delineated its claim of historic waters.365 This implies that Pharand’s third 
requirement - (iii) acquiescence by foreign states, is not fulfilled. The attitude of foreign 
states towards a claim of historic waters is significantly vital, especially in regards to 
those whose interests are largely affected.366 This was stated in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries case, further the Court ruled that: “the general toleration of foreign states with 
regard to the Norwegian practice is an unchallenged fact.“367 In addition, it took 60 years 
for the United Kingdom to conduct a formal and definite protest of the Norwegian 
straight baseline system based on the doctrine of historic waters, which has been noted by 
several scholars as of particular importance.368 O’Connell has analyzed several 
international decisions by the ICJ on the subject regarding the attitude of foreign states 
and states: “a protest, in order to be effective, must be made by all reasonable and lawful 
means.“369 As seen in Chapter 4.2.1, formal protests by the U.S. and the EC regarding 
historic title as a basis for internal waters in the NWP is most certainly in line with 
O’Connell’s interpretation.  
 
Finally, as concluded in Chapter 4.2, the NWP has been traversed by several vessels 
(mostly U.S.-flagged) without undergoing prior authorization from Canada. 
Notwithstanding the 1988 Agreement and the express understanding that  “nothing in this 
agreement … affects the respective positions of the two governments,“370 the Agreement 
is only subject to icebreakers and is therefore not applicable to commercial Arctic marine 
transport. As discussed in Chapter 4.2.3, the US-flagged oil tanker S/S Manhattan 
traversed the NWP without seeking Canada’s permission. This means that Pharand’s first 
requirement - (i) exclusive exercise of state jurisdiction, is not fulfilled. 
 
To summarize, the author’s view is therefore that Canada is not entitled to a historic title 
as basis for internal waters in the NWP, mainly due to the discrepancy between the 1951 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case and that Canada has not exercised exclusive jurisdiction 
over the NWP for a satisfactorily extensive period of time. This is in line with Pharand’s 
opinion and other Arctic scholars.371 However, it should be noted that some legal scholars 
have accepted the historic title argument in the NWP.372 This is significant for what was 
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stated above, the doctrine of historic waters is vague, controversial and in most cases 
indeterminate.373 
 
To conclude, there has never been an official claim for a historic title as basis for internal 
waters in the NSR, although there have been preventive domestic legislation aiming to 
keep this option available. This has lead to extensive ambiguity of the Soviet/Russian 
position. The TSR lies outside any Arctic coastal state’s jurisdiction, and has 
consequently not been subject for a historic title as a basis for internal waters. Canada in 
the NWP has for several times claimed a historic title starting with the first official 
declaration in 1973. However, as stated above, Canada is most certainly not entitled to a 
historic title, mainly due to a lack of proof that Canada has exercised exclusive 
jurisdiction over the NWP for a satisfactorily extensive period of time.  
 
State Practice 
As seen in Chapter 4, state practice in the NSR differs greatly in comparison to the NWP. 
Canadian state practice conducted in the NWP has been consistent and determined with 
little ambiguity. The TSR positions outside any Arctic coastal state’s jurisdiction, hence 
no comparison can be conducted in this regard. 
 
State practice on the NSR stands out in comparison to the NWP predominantly by quasi-
state practice by lawyers and maritime law experts within the Russia Duma, such as 
Volosov and Kolodkin who claims that Arctic states “may realize their powers in the 
region not only in accordance with international law, but also on the basis of national 
norms” (see Chapter 4.1.1). The fact that the Soviet/Russian Government has not 
unequivocally rejected these doctrinal claims has evolved to a general ambiguity of the 
Soviet/Russian approach towards the Arctic and the NSR.374 In addition, necessary 
domestic legal framework has been legislated by Russia to espouse such far-fetched 
doctrinal claims, see Chapter 4.1. Chilingarov’s statement, “Arctic Ocean is Russian 
territory”, after planting the Russian flag on the North Pole should here be noted, but not 
further commented.375 The wide distinctions between Soviet/Russian state practice and 
doctrinal views has lead to what other scholars has labeled as “creative ambiguity”.376 
Some legal observers have suggested that this ambiguity may be intentional.377 However, 
a more thoroughly discussion in this regard would break the boundaries and scope of this 
thesis, therefore this will not be further analyzed. 
 
The Sector Theory  
As concluded in Chapter 3.2, the speech held by Canadian Prime Minister in August 
2006 definitely illustrated the Canadian abandonment from the sector theory:  
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I am here today to make it absolutely clear that there is no question about 
Canada’s Arctic border. … All along the border, our jurisdiction extends 
outward 200 miles into the surrounding seas, … No more. And no less.378 
The Soviet/Russian approach in the NSR towards the sector theory is still shaded by 
some ambiguity (see Chapter 4.1.4). However, it needs to be underscored that neither 
Soviet nor Russia has never officially claimed waters beyond the limits of their national 
jurisdiction with basis in the sector theory.379 As concluded in Chapter 4.1.4.2, this is in 
part confirmed by the response to the U.S. military warships entering the Soviet sector in 
1957 – 1967. A modern example is the letter from the Russian Chief of the 
Administration of the NSR that was addressed to the Master of the Greenpeace vessel 
Solo (Chapter 4.1.4.1). No reference to the sector theory was stated in these responses. 
However, Soviet never clearly rejected the sector theory either.380 According to Franckx, 
“this was done intentionally to keep future policy options open.“381  
 
As noted in Chapter 4.1.4.2, Soviet/Russia argued in the negotiations for the treaty on 
maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (the 
“2010 Agreement”) towards recognition of the sector theory as a unique result of the 
area’s characteristics; inter alia, geographic, geological, demographic, strategic, and 
climatic factors.382 It is unclear if this implies that the sector theory could be regarded as a 
hands-on approach for delimitation maritime areas and which legal consequences this 
implies for the theory itself.383 It is evident that there are no legal bases in international 
law to legitimate the sector theory as means to claim territory (see Chapter 3).384 Given 
the factual background on the sector theory as provided in this thesis, the theory itself has 
most certainly not developed as a principle of customary law.385  
 
Legal Disputes and Controversies Concerning the International Strait Regime 
As discussed in Chapter 4.2.3, Canada is determined in its position that “Canada’s 
Northwest Passage is not used for international navigation and since Arctic waters are 
considered by Canada as internal waters, the régime of transit passage does not apply.“386 
The U.S. has consistently challenged the Canadian position, by the voyage of the US-
flagged oil tanker S/S Manhattan through the NWP, as well as by stating: “We cannot 
accept the assertion of a Canadian claim … such acceptance would jeopardize the 
freedom of navigation.“387 In addition, the EC has publicly disagreed with the Canadian 
viewpoint, but at the same time not publicly supported the U.S. perspective (see Chapter 
4.2.3). Despite different scholars interpretation388 of the Corfu Channel case regarding 
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“straits used for international navigation” the U.S. perspective has been unequivocal: “a 
strait used for international navigation covers all straits that are capable of being used for 
international navigation.“389 In comparison with the NSR, an identical dispute or 
controversy is very likely to occur given the driving forces behind the new accessible and 
commercial Arctic as provided in Chapter 2.2. However, no such dispute has arisen, 
hitherto mainly due to the major inter-sea straits of the NSR not being subject for 
international navigation as a result of Soviet and later Russia’s protectionist position of 
the NSR (see Chapter 4.1.4.2). The TSR lies outside any Arctic coastal state’s jurisdiction 
hence the sea route is not subject for the international strait regime and consequently no 
disputes or controversies have arisen in the matter. 
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6 Future Internationalization & 
Concluding Remarks 
Moving to the final analytical part of the thesis, this chapter will first discuss the 
secondarily purpose flowing from the first. Subsequently a general conclusion will be 
presented as well as some concluding remarks. The reader is noted that due to the 
intricacy and range of the legal disputes and controversies in the preceded chapters the 
conclusion is comprised to only raise the major points previously encountered.  
6.1 Future Internationalization in the Arctic Sea 
Routes 
6.1.1 Possible Internationalization?  
As stated in Chapter 2.1, reduced Arctic sea ice is a palpable sign of climate change with 
breaking record low sea ice extent and thickness in 2012 – emphasizing the downward 
trend since satellite observations began in 1979.390 This decline is progressively opening 
new opportunities for commercial activity in the region, such as Arctic marine transport 
traversing the “Arctic-shortcut” with distance savings as high as 40 percent compared to 
the traditional sea-lanes through the Suez Canal.391 In addition, estimations by the USGS 
states that the Arctic region could hold as much as 25 percent of the earth’s undiscovered 
oil and gas resources.392 
 
Given these commercially driving forces for marine Arctic transport, it is not far-fetched 
to anticipate a future with drastically increased activity in the three Arctic sea routes. 
Assumed what has been concluded in Chapter 5, most distinguishing would be the legal 
consequences if straits of the NSR or the NWP becomes a “strait used for international 
navigation” (international strait) due to internalization.393 The TSR in this regard remains 
unaffected since it routes outside any national jurisdiction.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.1 and 4.2.3, the threshold in the Corfu Channel case for an 
international strait was pledged rather high, given the interpretation of the two criteria: 
geographical and functional. However, in the Eastern Greenland case394 of 1933 the ICJ 
recognized that when applying general principles from international law into the Arctic 
one needs to take into account certain peculiar local conditions, such as the regions 
distant position on the world map and environment.395 As concluded in Chapter 2.2.1, 
Arctic marine transport is characterized by harsh conditions, remoteness of the region, 
absence of alternative routes and environmental consequences due to the Arctic’s fragile 
ecosystem. This might de facto imply a lower threshold for the sufficiency of 
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international navigation in the NSR and the NWP to become a “strait used for 
international navigation”. According to Pharand, a pattern of international shipping 
“developed over relatively few years, might be considered sufficient to make it 
international.“396 In conclusion, it is quite possible that the NSR and the NWP will 
transform to international straits due to internationalization.  
 
If various straits in the NSR and the NWP is to be regarded as international straights it 
becomes evident in light of Chapter 5 that Russia’s and Canada’s Arctic sovereignty to 
control navigation by foreign Arctic marine transport will decrease. In addition, several 
legal disputes and controversies dealt with in Chapter 4 will shift pattern fundamentally.  
6.1.2 Counsequences & Unresolved Issues 
What Right of Passage will apply after an Internationalization?  
As discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.1, UNCLOS, Part III, Section 2 established a new regime 
for vessels navigating straits used for international navigation, the “transit passage 
right”.397 Some peculiar remarks needs to be highlighted of the new right in regards to the 
NSR and the NWP.  
 
Firstly, the transit passage regime is according to Article 38(1) applicable to:  
 
Straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit 
passage, which shall no be impeded  
 
The adjective “all” needs to be emphasized, as it confirms that the entirety of vessels 
(including submarines) as well as aircrafts are subject for transit passage, and makes no 
distinction whether these are commercial or military. As Pharand notes;  
Including submarines in their normal mode of navigation. Unlike in the 
exercise of the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea where 
submarines have to surface, they may remain submerged for transit passage.398  
Pharand’s interpretation of submerged submarines is confirmed by several official 
declarations during the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.399 In addition, other 
scholars, such as O’Connell, state that: “submarines are by definition underwater 
vehicles, submerged passage is ‘normal mode’ of operation.“400  
Secondly, Article 44 declares that: “States bordering straits shall not hamper transit 
passage … there shall be no suspension of transit passage.“401 Given what has been 
concluded in Chapter 4 and 5, this provision indicates a definitive jurisdictional decrease 
in the NSR and the NWP, as discussed below.   
Thirdly, there are no criteria of innocence to fulfill according to Article 39(1), although 
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vessels and aircrafts need to: 
(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait; 
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any 
other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied 
in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(c) refrain from any other than those incident to their normal modes of 
continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force 
majeure or by distress; 
(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part. 
As concluded in Chapter 4.2.3, it is evident that the NWP fulfills the prerequisites for the 
geographical criteria of an international strait. However, the criteria’s application towards 
the NSR (in general) is tinged by some ambiguity due its complex geography. Dunlap has 
conducted extensive research on the subject in the research study ‘Transit Passage in the 
Russian Arctic Straits’ where the author concluded: 
Of the 43 straits considered, how many may become subject to transit passage 
if Russia succeeds in opening its Arctic waters to international shipping? On 
the assumption that they all will be “used for international navigation” within 
the meaning of article 37, there are five conditions any one of which may 
disqualify a strait from the transit-passage regime or from the entire regime for 
international straits.402 
Dunlap line up five exemptions which may disqualify a strait from the transit passage 
regime, or the prerequisites for an international strait: (i) Not connecting two parts of the 
high seas or EEZ, (ii) Being in internal waters (other than those newly enclosed), (iii) A 
through route of similar convenience in the high seas or EEZ, (iiii) A seaward route of 
similar convenience through the high seas or EEZ, (iiiii) Being subject to a long-standing 
international convention.403 
In conclusion, Dunlap states that: “there are strong arguments that none of the five 
exemptions removes any of the 43 straits from the overall regime of international straits 
or from the transit-passage regime.“404 
To summarize, it is evident from this brief analysis that given the geographical criteria 
the transit passage regime’s geographical prerequisites are fulfilled. Although there are 
some ambiguity on its application towards the NSR. The second criteria, functional, are 
of a more complex nature and several sub-questions and unresolved issues needs to be 
addressed here.  
Firstly, at what point will vessel or aircraft traffic be sufficient to justify a transit passage 
right in the NWP and the NSR according to the functional criteria? As concluded in 
Chapter 4.2.3, for the new regime to be applicable in the NWP and the NSR they must be 
applied to “straits which are used for international navigation“, according to Article 37 of 
UNCLOS. The phrase derives from customary law, mainly as interpreted in the Corfu 
Channel case.405 Surprisingly there is a lack of interest and discussion of the extent on the 
verb “used” (functional criteria) in the legal doctrine, which given its importance should 
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be addressed more thoroughly. Dunlap claims that: 
On one level, it would not be unreasonable to assert that any foreign vessel 
engaged in international navigation would be entitled to transit, under the new 
regime, any strait through which another foreign vessel has already passed.406 
In Dunlap’s interpretation, the NSR and the NWP would already be subject for the new 
regime (in regards to the functional criteria) solely due to the l’Astrolabe traversing the 
NSR (Chapter 5.2), or the S/S Manhattan traversing the NWP (Chapter 4.2.3).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4.2.3, Pharand is of another opinion, claiming that: “it is evident 
that the Northwest Passage has not had a useful history as a useful route for international 
maritime traffic.“407  
 
The U.S. perspective has been that the functional criteria include potential or future use 
(see Chapter 4.2.3). However, this has been considered to be non-acceptable among the 
great majority of scholars due to its excessively broad interpretation.408 
It is interesting to note that according to most scholars, including Pharand, the transit 
passage regime’s functional criteria does not appear to correlate only to vessels or 
aircrafts previously invited by the coastal state. In conjunction with Article 37 of 
UNCLOS and official declarations409 drawn at the third UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea some scholars has suggested that there seems to be a legal possibility of 
“bootstrapping” a strait in the NSR or the NWP into the transit passage regime, merely by 
transiting it.410 For example, a U.S. uninvited submarine for either one (Dunlap’s 
interpretation), or several times (Pharand’s interpretation).  
Given that the transit passage regime will govern due to internationalization in the straits 
of the NSR and the NWP, previously as well as on-going legal disputes and controversies 
will shift pattern fundamentally. Most distinguishing would be the Canadian 
jurisdictional decrease over foreign Arctic marine transport. Mostly due to its enclosed 
internal waters by straight baselines, where no right of innocent passage exist (as 
concluded in Chapter 4.2.4).  
Authority over Vessels Exercising Transit Passage Right 
Vessels traversing the seaways of the NSR and the NWP under the transit passage regime 
are subject for authority from the bordering state by Article 42 and 233 of UNCLOS. 
Article 42 states that:  
Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may adopt 
laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits. 
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The provision gives bordering states the right to regulate safety of navigation and 
maritime traffic, sea-lanes and separation schemes, prevention and reduction of pollution, 
and prevention of illigeal fishing.411 Article 233 stipulates enforcement powers to the 
coastal state in case of violation a board a foreign vessel.412 
However, the relationship between the two provisions and the transit passage regime 
needs to be emphasized. Article 233 states that: “nothing in sections 5, 6 and 7 affects the 
legal regime of straits used for international navigation.“ Pharand has emphasized this 
relationship, he states:  
Two limitations on the authority of the bordering state must here be underlined. 
First, its regulatory powers under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 42 are 
limited to giving affect to applicable international regulations. Second, its 
enforcement powers under Article 233 … are restricted to cases where a 
foreign ship has committed a violation.413 
As noted in Chapter 3.1.2, Article 234 grants coastal states a special regulatory power and 
enforcement rights in ice-covered waters. The provision’s application is not excluded 
from “straits used for international navigation”, as compared to Article 42 and 233. In 
conclusion, Article 42 and 233 provides bordering states with limited authority when 
vessels are exercising the transit passage right.  
The Possible Forthcoming Regime of Transit Passage and Article 234 
As concluded in Chapter 5, Article 234 has been subject for extensive ambiguity. So is 
also the case when analyzing the provision’s relationship towards the transit passage 
regime. Firstly, it is unclear whether Article 234 trounces the regime of transit passage or 
vice versa. Since UNCLOS or customary law gives no guidance in the subject matter, the 
question has been subject for much ambiguity in the legal doctrine. In addition, several 
scholars’ interpretation of case law and opinions are heavily diverged. Due to such 
diverse opinions, Pharand has suggested that: 
Since there are no so-called, ‘travaux préparatoires’, paramount weight should 
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in form or in fact among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of denying, 
hampering or impairing the right of transit passage as defined in this section. 3. States bordering straits 
shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations. 4. Foreign ships exercising the right of transit 
passage shall comply with such laws and regulations. 5. The flag State of a ship or the State of registry of 
an aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity which acts in a manner contrary to such laws and regulations or 
other provisions of this Part shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage which results to 
States bordering straits.“  
412 UNCLOS, Article 233 reads as follows: “Nothing in sections 5, 6 and 7 affects the legal regime of straits 
used for international navigation. However, if a foreign ship other than those referred to in section 10 has 
committed a violation of the laws and regulations referred to in article 42, paragraph 1(a) and (b), causing 
or threatening major damage to the marine environment of the straits, the States bordering the straits may 
take appropriate enforcement measures and if so shall respect mutatis mutandis the provisions of this 
section.” 
413 Donat Pharand, supra note 360, pp. 46 – 47.  
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be given to the opinion of negotiators of the Article. Only they are able to 
speak of the true intent behind the words and their special meaning, if any.414  
 
Unfortunately for this thesis, there is no such information available. However, given the 
analyzed state practice in Chapter 5.3, one could for certain assure that Russia in the NSR 
and Canada in the NWP will be of the opposite view and interpretation than the U.S. and 
the EC, as well as other States who could benefit from navigational freedom for 
commercial Arctic marine transport.  
 
It is interesting to note however that predictions according to a recent study by DNV (see 
Chapter 2.2.1), the ice-free time of the Arctic’s main transportation routes will increase 
from roughly 30 days in 2011 to more than 120 around in 2060. The study in conjunction 
with the wording of Article 234, such as “in ice-covered areas” and “most of the year” is 
highly interesting, although unclear. Several sub-question arises in this matter, such as 
what level of ice cover is required? Will even partial ice cover be sufficient? What 
exactly is “most of the year”, and so on. These types of uncertainties regarding Article 
234 are still unresolved, although one can conclude that a decrease of ice-coverage in 
certain areas of the NSR and the NWP implies that the increase of Arctic sovereignty 
through Article 234 (as concluded in Chapter 5.2) might not be so trustable in light of the 
rapidly changing dynamics of the Arctic region due to climate change. 
6.2 General Conclusion and Ending Remarks 
Since conclusions as well as summaries have been made throughout the preceded 
chapters (due to the large amount of legal disputes and controversies) this conclusion will 
only briefly summarize the major points of the most important elements encountered.  
 
The first question related to the primary purpose was:  
 
o Which are the legal disputes and controversies in the Arctic sea routes that 
materially constrain Arctic marine transport? What are their origins?  
 
Firstly, it has been concluded that there are several legal disputes and controversies in the 
Arctic sea routes which directly or indirectly could constrain Arctic marine transport. 
However, given the conclusions drawn in Chapter 4 and 5 it becomes evident that the 
following legal disputes and controversies materially constrain Arctic marine transport: 
 
• Internal waters in the NWP due to Canada’s straight baselines based under 
customary law (Chapter 4.2.2)   
 
• “Creeping Jurisdiction” in the NSR (Chapter 4.1.1)  
 
• Increase of Arctic sovereignty through Article 234 and the provision’s ambiguity 
towards the transit passage regime (Chapter 5.2)  
 
• Ambiguity regarding different interpretations of the transit passage regime and the 
international strait provision (Chapter 5.3 and 6)  
                                                
414 Ibid, p. 46.   
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In summary, both the NSR and the NWP are tinged by several legal disputes, 
controversies, and ambiguity. In addition, neither Russia nor Canada is actively 
promoting international usage of their respective sea routes which combined is a major 
limiting factor for commercial Arctic marine transport according to a recent research 
study by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs.415 In contrast to the 
NSR and the NWP, the TSR positions outside any Arctic State’s jurisdiction and is 
therefore almost free from legal disputes and controversies.416 It is possible that marine 
transportation companies will focus on the possibility of traversing the TSR instead of the 
NSR and the NWP, avoiding disputes and controversies stemming from domestic law and 
far-fetched interpretations of international law.417 A more thoroughly analyze on this is 
outside the scope of this thesis though, such as the question on how these disputes and 
controversies affects commercial marine transport. However, despite disputes and 
controversies in the NSR and the NWP, all three Arctic sea routes have the potential to 
transform commercial shipping into the 21st century, the outcome how this will play out 
remains to bee seen though.  
 
The second question related to the primary purpose was:  
 
o What are the commonalities, differences and similarities of the legal 
disputes and controversies in the Arctic sea routes previously presented and 
what conclusions can be made of this in a wider scope?  
 
Chapter 5 comprised a descriptive analyze through a comparative method where the aim 
was to analyze commonalities, differences and similarities of the legal disputes and 
controversies.  
 
In a wider scope than previously applied in Chapter 5, two general conclusions can here 
be drawn. Firstly, the Arctic approach and legal development by Soviet/Russia and 
Canada seems to be shaped mainly through foreign actions, primarily conducted by the 
U.S.418 For an example, the voyage in the NWP by the S/S Manhattan without permission 
can be mentioned, where Canada responded by enacting more stringent pollution 
legislation (AWPPA).419 A similar situation was the U.S. coast guard activity in the NSR 
during 1959-1965, where Soviet responded by claiming that foreign vessels are forced to 
obtain an official permission for icebreaker and ice-forecasting support, as well as a 
general permission to traverse the NSR.420 As one author has observed: “the difficulty of 
negotiating ice passage without icebreaker and ice-forecasting support, the Soviet Union 
effectively nationalized the route years ago.“421 In practice, the cited has fallen out to be 
somewhat correct, since no icebreaker, or commercial vessel, has accomplished the 
crossing without approval from Moscow.422 The Polar Sea incident in 1985 should here 
                                                
415 Arild Moe & Øystein Jensen, Directorate-General For External Policies, supra note 324, pp. 13 – 15.  
416 Depending on the interpretation concerning the ”creeping jurisdiction” in the NSR, this may involve the 
TSR, see Chapter 4.1.1. 
417 Arild Moe & Øystein Jensen reaches the same conclusion see, Directorate-General For External 
Policies, supra note 324, p. 15.  
418 Franckx reaches a similar conclusion, see Erik Franckx, supra note 145, p. 295. 
419 See Chapter 4.2.1 & Chapter 3.1.1.2.  
420 See Chapter 4.1.4.1.  
421 William V. Dunlap, supra note 161, p. 55.  
422 Erik Franckx, supra note 145, p. 294.  
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also be noted, since Canada after the incident reacted by drawing straight baselines 
around its Archipelago, see Chapter 4.1.2 and Chapter 4.2.2. It should be noted that the 
U.S. and Canada has exchanged diplomatic correspondence previous of all actions on a 
“agree to disagree”-basis of the legal divergence regarding the NWP (see for an example 
Chapter 4.2.5 concerning the 1988 Agreement). 
 
Secondly, Russia and its predecessor in the NSR as well as Canada in the NWP (although 
in a much smaller regard) has from the start been provided by legal scholars of respective 
Government or Duma with a broad variety of different legal arguments for Arctic 
sovereignty, such as the sector theory, the “ice-is-land-theory” (glacies firma as terra 
firma-res nullius), historic title, exaggerated interpretation of Article 234 etc. The main 
goal among these scholars seems to have been to provide the two respective States with 
basis for partial or all-embracing claims on maritime expanses in the Arctic. However, it 
has been clearly demonstrated that the Canadian Government and the Soviet/Russian 
Duma have not correlated with these scholars’ interpretations and theories, since state 
practice shows that both States has been very reluctant to espouse such far-fetched legal 
arguments. Contrary, maybe as a result of the first observation in this conclusion, it has 
been shown that both States has adopted a more functionalistic, step-by-step approach 
towards the legal status of the Arctic.  
 
As concluded above, both States have succeeded in increasing their Arctic sovereignty of 
their respective sea route. However, some discrepancies between the two State’s Arctic 
approach in obtaining this jurisdictional increase needs to be noted. Canada in the NWP 
has been labeled as the more “aggressive” State in comparison to Soviet and especially 
Russia in the NSR, as an example the AWPPA legislation in 1970 can be mentioned 
where Canada, according to Franckx, “did not mind coming very close to the limit of 
what was tolerated by international law, sometimes even trespassing it.“423 Given the 
present ambiguity surrounding Article 234 of UNCLOS and its “express” incorporation 
into international law (due to diplomatic pressure from Canada), the author of this thesis 
reaches the same conclusion as Franckx. In comparison to Soviet, it was (contrary to 
Canada) only after the incorporation of Article 234 Soviet adopted its edict on the 
protection of Arctic environment in the NSR (see Chapter 3.1.1.2). 
 
The final conclusion in the second question related to the primary purpose is that the 
main theme of the examined legal disputes and controversies is the lack of official 
statements by coastal states bordering the sea routes. In several disputes the legal position 
is unclear in international law, which given the lack of official statements has given 
scholar’s divergence of interpretation a considerable weight in determining the legal 
status of the Arctic sea routes. This ambiguity could be intentional, such as neither Soviet 
or Russia openly rejects maritime expanse claims by prominent Soviet/Russian scholars 
within the Duma – i.e. keeping the option available for the future (see Chapter 5.3). 
However, the author of this thesis is of the opinion that this theory is to academically 
problematizing the reality. A more modest and unpretentious explanation would be that 
the lack of official statements is due to that these disputes and controversies are widely 
irrelevant for the stakeholders of the Arctic, especially Soviet/Russia since the NSR is not 
yet commercially viable given its current impassible waterways without ice-breaker and 
ice-forecasting support from the Russian Government.424 Given the Arctic’s unique 
                                                
423 Ibid, p. 295.  
424 See more at Chapter 2.2.1.   
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characteristics and navigational environment for marine Arctic transport, the NSR is 
already nationalized in this practical regard. This applies to the NWP as well. However, 
as concluded in Chapter 2, this may be the subject for change since climate change is 
rapidly re-forming the region.  
 
The secondary purpose, originating from the first, was to analyze the legal consequences 
of a future internationalization in the three Artic sea routes and how it will affect the 
previously presented disputes and controversies. The first of the two questions here was: 
 
o What right of passage would apply after an internationalization in the NSR, 
the NWP, and the TSR?  
 
Firstly, it was concluded that given the commercially driving forces for marine Arctic 
transport it is not far-fetched to anticipate a future with drastically increased activity in 
the three Arctic sea routes. In light of what has been concluded in Chapter 5, most 
distinguishing would be the legal consequences if the NSR or the NWP becomes a “strait 
used for international navigation” (international strait) due to internalization.425 It was 
further concluded that the TSR in this regard remains unaffected, since it routes outside 
any national jurisdiction. If straits in the NSR and the NWP become internationalized the 
right of transit passage will govern.  
 
However, as concluded in Chapter 3.1.1.1 and 4.2.3, the threshold in the Corfu Channel 
case for an international strait was pledged rather high, given the interpretation of the two 
criteria: geographical and functional. Due to a lack of a more thoroughly definition on a 
“strait used for international navigation” than provided in UNCLOS Article 34 – 45  (see 
Chapter 3.1.1.1), the legal position is uncertain. The geographic criteria as set out in 
Article 37 is meet in the NWP and probably the NSR, although there remains ambiguity 
in this regard (see Chapter 6.1.2). Consequently, it still remains ambiguity on the 
interpretation of the Corfu Channel case, predominantly concerning the functional 
criteria. In addition, it is possible that Russia and Canada will take adequate preventive 
measures for an internationalization of straits in their respective sea routes, such as inter 
alia making NORDREG426 mandatory as one author has suggested.427  
 
The final question from the secondary purpose, originating from the first, was: 
o What would the legal consequences be of the presented legal disputes and 
controversies if the transit passage regime would apply?  
 
Firstly, it is unclear whether Article 234 trounces the regime of transit passage or vice 
versa. Since UNCLOS or customary law gives no guidance in the subject matter, the 
question has been subject for much ambiguity. Unfortunately for this thesis, the question 
has not been able to be further analyzed in lack of legal sources and doctrine. However, 
given the analyzed state practice in Chapter 5.3, one could for certain assure that Russia 
                                                
425 See Chapter 3.1.1.1 & Chapter 4.2.3 regarding a “strait used for international navigation”, i.e. 
international strait.  
426 The Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone establishes the Vessel Traffic Reporting Arctic 
Canada Traffic Zones (NORDREG), which implements requirements for Arctic marine transport to report 
information prior to entering and operating within Canada’s northern waters. See more at: 
<http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/MCTS/Vtr_Arctic_Canada> accessed 21 July 2013.   
427 Donat Pharand, supra note 360, p. 59.  
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in the NSR and Canada in the NWP will be of the opposite view and interpretation than 
the U.S. and the EC, as well as other States who could benefit from navigational freedom 
for commercial Arctic marine transport. In addition, ambiguity regarding the wording of 
Article 234 should also be noted, such as “in ice-covered areas” and “most of the year”. 
Several legal issues remains in this matter, for an example, what level of ice cover is 
required for the provision to be applicable? Given the rapidly changing dynamics of the 
Arctic region, this provision might not be so trustable in the future.   
 
Secondly, the NSR and the NWP are affected in dissimilar ways if the transit passage 
regime would govern. Primarily the decrease of jurisdictional sovereignty due to the 
innocent passage regime needs to be emphasized. As concluded by the author in Chapter 
5, innocent passage applies in general for the waters of the NSR. Waters of the NWP are 
strictly internal waters due to Canada’s straight baselines based under customary law (see 
Chapter 4.2.4) and therefore foreign Arctic marine transport is not entitled to the right of 
innocent passage. Given this, Canada in comparison to Russia would see a stronger 
decrease of jurisdictional Arctic sovereignty and control. The difference concerning 
bordering state’s authority and marine transport’s “innocence” when entitled to the 
innocent passage right in comparison to the transit passage regime should also be noted 
here. In addition, if the transit passage regime would govern straits of the NSR and the 
NWP, new legal questions would emerge as well.  
 
In conclusion, the main theme of the secondary purpose goes hand in hand with the 
general conclusions of the first purpose. There has been, and still is, a lack of official 
statements of the coastal states in the Arctic and other major stakeholders, such as the 
IMO. Given the uncertain legal position of the Arctic and different scholars 
interpretations this has lead to a general ambiguity on how to approach, for an example, 
the transit passage regime. Especially the spatial scope of Article 234 and whether the 
regime prevails over the transit passage regime or vice versa should be emphasized. The 
author of this thesis is of the opinion that the underlying reason is that these questions are 
largely irrelevant for others than of academic interest, since the Arctic sea routes are not 
yet commercially viable. However, given the rapidly changing dynamics of the Arctic 
and the regions opulence of economic opportunities it is not far-fetched to anticipate a 
future with drastically increased Arctic marine transport. In reference to this, it is evident 
that any legal gaps creating legal disputes and controversies in the Arctic sea routes needs 
to be thoroughly addressed and sealed.  
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